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So do not be afraid; you are of more value than many sparrows. 
 
- Jesus Christ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge: as he beholds what confronts him, its being is disclosed to the knower. What he 
beheld as present he will have to comprehend as an object, compare with objects, assign a 
place in an order of objects, and describe and analyze objectively; only as an It can it be 
absorbed into the store of knowledge. But in the act of beholding it was no thing among 
things, no event among events; it was present exclusively. 
 
- Martin Buber  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The starting point for every reflection on disability is rooted in the fundamental convictions 
of Christian anthropology: even when disabled persons are mentally impaired or when 
their sensory or intellectual capacity is damaged, they are fully human beings and possess 
the sacred and inalienable rights that belong to every human creature. Indeed, human 
beings, independently of the conditions in which they live or of what they are able to express, 
have a unique dignity and a special value from the very beginning of their life until the 
moment of natural death. 
 
- John Paul II 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 What does it mean to speak about the dignity of a human person? Is it permissible to 
speak about the dignity of trees and rocks? Does a rock share a sacred space in which we, as a 
society, develop laws to protect the rights and dignity of the rocks? What is it about the human 
person that demands protection from the state? What is it about the human person that demands 
respect from other human persons? What is this thing called ‘personhood’ that demands respect 
from other persons? Is there something special about the person that demands my full respect? 
What is this thing that we single out as ‘special’ in the human person?  
 In America at least, when we speak of the dignity of the human person, we are usually 
referring to something special or inviolable about the human person that protects them from 
being treated like the rest of the objects in the world; that is, we distinguish between a ‘someone’ 
and a ‘something.’ Why else would we have judges, juries and courts if we did not think that 
someone needed protection from violence or manipulation from other human persons? The 
primary referent in our development of civil laws, and state and federal policies, is the human 
person – the protection of the human person in all his rights and dignity. Human rights seem to 
be grounded in the concept of the human person – the dignity of the human person.  
 
 Though the above may seem to be common-sense to us, nevertheless the notion of what 
dignity is is left obscure and in need of explanation. This thesis paper is an exploration of what 
this thing we call ‘dignity’ is. The concept of dignity will be looked at in terms of the different 
features of the human person. Personhood and dignity are closely related in the sense that the 
term “person” refers to the human self – the ‘I’ and dignity is that which refers to the special 
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feature of the human person. The main question that will be discussed in this thesis paper is what 
makes the human person – special, irreplaceable, inviolable – a possessor of dignity.1   
 
I. Problem: Is Dignity an Empty Concept? 
Traditionally, the word dignity referred to human beings with a special status – 
something that sets them apart from other human beings. This special status was conferred only 
on some human beings. The status was seen in degrees; that is, it was one of hierarchy or rank. 
An example of those who did not possess this special status were slaves; they were the lowest 
beings on the societal scale. It was not until the time of Kant that the term ‘dignity’ came to refer 
to something intrinsic to the human person; that is; dignity came to mean something special 
about all human beings. The word dignity today, if one looks at the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights document, which was published after World War II, uses the term ‘dignity’ to 
refer to the human being’s capacity to reason.2  
If dignity means that there is something special about all human beings, then it would 
seem that we need to look at personhood – the characteristics that set persons off from non-
persons. The problem of dignity, as found in the current philosophical literature, is whether it is 
necessary to evoke the term ‘dignity’ in the discussion anymore since all capacities that the 
human possesses are not, in and of themselves, special. Thus dignity would seem to be lost in the 
discussion of the criteria of what is a person, human or not. Post Kant, dignity was taken for 
                                                 
1 By ‘special’ I mean irreplaceable, inviolable, something that does not admit of a price. Dignity is referring 
to the special characteristic of the human person. This thesis paper will look at what is that which is irreplaceable, 
special, and inviolable about the human person. One will notice how difficult it will be to find the sufficient 
condition for the dignity of persons.  
  
2  UN General Assembly, "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," UN General Assembly (1948). Article 
one, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience 
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” 
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granted as referring to something intrinsic to the human being; Kant thought dignity was 
grounded in the human person’s capacity to set ends for oneself. This is now disputed since it 
seems that no capacity has the ontological weight to anchor the concept of dignity anymore. 
Thus dignity is now seen as a concept that has no referent in the world of objects.  
A good current example of dignity being regarded as an empty concept can be found in a 
paper written by Ruth Macklin, Dignity is a Useless Concept. In this article, which is written to 
the medical community, she asks whether the concept of dignity is a coherent concept. She asks, 
“Why, then, do so many articles and reports appeal to human dignity, as if it means something 
over and above respect for persons or for their autonomy?”3 She is asking the right question, viz., 
whether dignity is more than one’s capacities, qualities or properties. If dignity is something 
that is derived from the person’s capacities, then yes, it seems that dignity is a meaningless 
concept.4  
Another example of the problem of dignity comes from Peter Singer. He argues that the 
value of the person is not dependent upon whether the person is a member of the human species.5 
Given the historical, theological distinction between person and human being (though not 
humans, the members of the Godhead are persons), Peter Singer is correct in pointing out the 
                                                 
3 Ruth Macklin, "Dignity Is a Useless Concept," British Medical Journal 327(2003). 
 
4 Another source that takes a similar position on dignity is Tom Beauchamp in his article, The Failure of 
Theories of Personhood. A difference is that he does not think any theory of personhood accounts for why human 
beings are more valuable than any other species. He thinks at best that we are sneaking in metaphysical properties to 
account for such special status, but that this is unwarranted due to the contingent link between human beings and 
their capacities. A case in point is the handicapped human being who has not, and will not ever exercise certain 
capacities. 
 
 5 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics  (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). In the 
context of talking about the value of a human fetus Singer says, “The point should by now be familiar: whether a 
being is or is not a member of our species is, in itself no more relevant to the wrongness of killing it than whether it 
is or is not a member of our race. The belief that mere membership of our species, irrespective of other 
characteristics, makes a great difference to the wrongness of killing a being is a legacy of religious doctrines that 
even those opposed to abortion hesitate to bring into the debate (150).” 
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distinction between being a person and being a human being. But for Singer, a person is only one 
who is self-conscious, can set ends for him or herself, and has the capacity to feel. In order for 
the human being to have a full moral status (dignity) one must actually have the capacities. 
Singer takes these criteria for personhood and applies it to the human fetus:  
My suggestion, then, is that we accord the life of a fetus no greater value than the life of a 
nonhuman animal at a similar level of rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, capacity 
to feel, etc. Since no fetus is a person, no fetus has the same claim to life as a person. We 
have yet to consider at what point the fetus is likely to become capable of feeling pain. 
For now it will be enough to say that until that capacity exists, an abortion terminates an 
existence that is of no “intrinsic” value at all (S 151). 
 
In other words, as far as Singer is concerned, a fetus possesses relatively low value since 
value comes in degrees. A sentient being, let us say a pig, that has the capacity to feel pain, has 
more value than a fetus at this point in his/her life. The problem, of course, is that this grants the 
fetus no dignity/moral status at all! I would contend that the reason the fetus has no dignity, 
given Singer’s criteria, is precisely because the concept of dignity is a thin concept that needs to 
be enriched by other sources.6  
Ruth Macklin and Peter Singer seem to be on the same page when they make reference to 
dignity. By dignity, they do not mean something that goes above and beyond the person’s 
capacities. If Macklin and Singer are correct, then it would follow that any human being or thing 
that does not manifest the properties of rationality are things that do not have full 
dignity/personhood.7 What about those who are infants or those human beings who happen to be 
disabled? Are they not considered full persons? Are we to be satisfied with making a conditional 
                                                 
6 This criteria of personhood is not only used by Singer but also by Mary Anne Warren in On the Moral 
and Legal Status of Abortion (1973), Micheal Tooley in Abortion and Infanticide (1972) and In Defense of Abortion 
and Infanticide (1984), and Daniel Dennett in Conditions of Personhood (1976).  
 
7 It seems that Peter Singer is using the terms, ‘dignity’ and ‘personhood,’ in the same univocal sense. 
There does not seem to be a distinction between those two terms as he uses them.  
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statement about them as if they were full persons? If so, then let us act as if those in the human 
community with disabilities are full persons who have the fullness of dignity.  
In the above section, the problem seems to be located in the concept of dignity itself. The 
problem is not the distinction between persons and human beings, but rather it is the concept of 
dignity.  In this thesis I hope to respond to this problem by setting up ways to account for our 
intuitions as to who counts as persons and, as such, possess dignity.  
 
II. The Response to the Problem of Dignity 
In response to Singer and Macklin I will be focusing on what makes a human person 
infinitely valuable and irreplaceable. The latter distinction comes from Kant in his Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals (hereafter GMM) in which he says, “In the kingdom of ends 
everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as 
its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no 
equivalent has a dignity (42).”8 
The worth of a person is above all price and admits of no equivalence. In other words, 
the dignity of a person does not admit of degrees but is given as an either/or. Either a human 
being has it or he does not. Now of course we can conceive of a world in which no human beings 
have dignity but it seems to go against our deepest intuitions about human life. Peter Singer at 
least admits that there is such thing as a moral status called personhood that can be applied to 
human beings for the protection given by civil law.  
 
                                                 
8 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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A. Infinite Value 
According to Kant, the irreplaceability of persons follows from the infinite value the 
person has. Given that the person has infinite value, it would follow that the person cannot be 
just one of many.9 Rather, the person is unique in that it is, metaphorically speaking, a world of 
its own. Let me flesh that out a little more here: Let us take Salvador Dali’s Christ of St. John of 
the Cross painting as an example of the distinction made by Kant. It is true that the original 
painting of Dali’s is irreplaceable, but is it of infinite value?10 If I were to have the original 
painting in my possession and were in need of money, could I not try to sell it for a price? If I 
sell the painting for a price, then it would seem that I am admitting that it is not of infinite value. 
Indeed, if paintings were of infinite value, there would be very few of them sold by human 
persons. Another interesting point is the fact that we speak of owning paintings. To own 
something means to have property rights over the object in question. That brings to my mind 
what Martin Luther King Jr. has to say on the distinction between property and persons.  
In his book The Trumpet of Conscience he writes, 
I am aware that there are many who wince at a distinction between property and persons 
– who hold both sacrosanct. My views are not so rigid. A life is sacred. Property is 
                                                 
9 Linda Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons," The Journal of Religious Ethics 29, no. 3 (2001). 
Zagzebski interprets Kant’s phrase, ‘raised above all price,’ to mean of ‘infinite value.’ That which has infinite value 
is something that does not admit of any market price. If something has infinite value, it entails that that thing is 
irreplaceable. Zagzebski interprets Kant as saying that anything that has dignity is more valuable than anything that 
has a price. It entails irreplaceability because anything that does not admit of a price is also something that cannot be 
compared. The two concepts are logically connected for Kant, but not conceptually identical.  
 
10 Clarification: By using the term ‘irreplaceable’ I am highlighting the fact that some natural or artificial 
object, by its nature, is something unique. The term ‘unique’ means one of a kind, and denotes that which does not 
share its being with another. If it did, it would not be unique. By ‘sharing its being with another’ I mean sharing the 
same species or genus. For something to be defined/categorized is for its essence to be communicable in nature. By 
the term ‘infinite value’ I mean just that which does not admit of any degrees. The value of The Cross of St. John of 
the Cross admits of a price and hence of a degree of value. The value is not infinite since we can conceive of the 
painting being put on Amazon or eBay and being sold for a finite price, whatever that price may be.  
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intended to serve life, and no matter how much we surround it with rights and respect, it 
has no personal being. It is part of the earth man walks on; it is not man (649).11 
 
In our everyday speech we speak of property as something of finite value, which admits 
of a price. With the above distinction we can see why dignity must mean something that has 
infinite value, for if it admits of a price, we can then say that some human persons have more 
value than other human persons.  
 
B. Irreplaceable value 
In our concept of dignity we do not want to leave out another aspect of human persons. 
That is, we want to say that human persons are not only of infinite value but of irreplaceable 
value. From what we have said above, does it follow that if a human person is of infinite value 
she/he is also irreplaceable?  It does not seem so, given the nonequivalence of these terms in 
connection with Salvador Dali’s painting of Christ of St. John of the Cross. But before we 
analyze what the connection is between infinite value and irreplaceability, let us look at the 
concept of someone/something being irreplaceable.  
Though we cannot say that Dali’s painting is of infinite value, we can say that it is of 
irreplaceable value. In Christopher Grau’s article, Irreplaceability and Unique Value, we see that 
the history attached to the valued object is very important to us. In our example, the artist 
                                                 
11 M.L. King, A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr  
(HarperCollins, 1990). Martin Luther King Jr. is writing in response to the urban riots of the black community in 
1967, which is a couple of years after the Civil Rights Bill and the Voting Rights Act were passed by Congress and 
the President of United States. The response is in light of the property damage that happened during the riots. The 
focus, in other words, was on non-violence protests against the white upper class, but not on the damage done to 
their property. King Jr. was defending a more charitable interpretation of what actually happened and who was 
targeted in the riots of ’67. Property was targeted, he argues, and not people. The interpretation given by the U.S. 
media was one where property trumpeted in value more than the cries of the black community! 
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Salvador Dali painted the painting, and only he painted that painting.12 The way the painting 
came about is itself an important aspect of why we consider it irreplaceable. To substitute for 
Dali’s painting another one would effectively mean that the latter was equivalent to the one that 
cannot be replaced. But such a substitute would not be the original painting. It would be a 
substitute not painted by Dali.  
The talk about substituting one thing for the other is talk about replaceability. To 
substitute the original painting by Dali with a painting not done by him makes a significant 
difference in how we gauge the value of things. But I am hesitant to say that the painting itself is 
irreplaceable because of some intrinsic value that it has in and of itself since the value of the 
painting seems to be derived from the fact that Salvador Dali painted it. That is, the value seems 
to be derived from the human person, in this case, Dali, and those who value his paintings. If 
there were no human persons on earth to paint but it was filled with original paintings, then it 
seems that the paintings would not have irreplaceable value. It seems absurd even to talk about 
original paintings having irreplaceable value if there were no artist to endow them with value, or 
persons to recognize that value.  
It is one thing to speak about paintings being irreplaceable, but what can we say about 
human persons having irreplaceable value?  Say that, unbeknownst to me, someone duplicated 
my wife and replaced her by someone with the same properties. Would I find anything out of the 
                                                 
12 Christopher Grau, "Irreplaceability and Unique Value," Philosophical Topics 32, no. 1-2 (2006). In 
reference to the uniqueness of persons, Grau says, “I want to argue that it is the particular shared history between 
the lover and the beloved that plays this individuating role, and thus helps us to make the lovers truly irreplaceable 
to each other. No one else can have a shared history, and accordingly no one else can take the place of the beloved. 
Further, I think that much of the importance we place on shared history can be illuminated through a focus on the 
role that shared agency plays in a relationship (127).” This unique aspect of persons will be fleshed out in chapter 
two of this paper.  But for now it suffices to say that history of individual actions plays an individuating role to 
account for the uniqueness of persons. I will argue later that such an individuating role is not grounded properly in 
the subjectivity of persons, but that it needs to be if the person is unique and not merely his actions.  
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ordinary if I were approached by her clone? I would think so. It then would not be her whom I 
love but someone else! How could I say that the clone is the same person as my wife? Sure, it is 
logically possible that such a switch could occur, but highly unlikely given the metaphysical 
nature of my wife and her being an individual substance of a rational nature.13  
What is the alternative to viewing the human person as irreplaceable? That some human 
beings are not persons? Lacking the irreplaceable uniqueness that we associate with personhood, 
such beings would likewise lack value. Who are these human beings? Are they the vulnerable, 
the elderly and small children? Who determines who is irreplaceable and who is not? What is the 
criterion for a human being to be a person, and to have dignity? 
 
C. The Justification for the Two Aspects of Dignity 
If the infinite value and irreplaceability of persons are essential aspects of dignity, then 
what grounds these concepts? I would submit that the human person himself grounds them. The 
importance of this question must be stressed, for if the human person is not irreplaceable and 
does not possess infinite value, then there is nothing to violate. No law can protect the human 
person who lacks these aspects of dignity. It is one thing to do conceptual analysis of 
irreplaceability and another thing to talk about what things are essentially irreplaceable.  
To answer the question of the ground of human dignity, I believe Linda Zagzebski is 
correct in observing that the irreplaceable aspect of dignity must be something that is not 
                                                 
13 These thought experiments seem to work if one holds to a Cartesian understanding of the body and soul. 
For the ‘I’ is not the body qua body but the soul. The Cartesian soul is one that has all the mental properties that can 
be switched with another person. There is nothing that would safeguard persons if such a thought experiment were 
to obtain in reality. We start not with thought but with beings, with that which exists! Human beings are not by their 
nature divided into constituent parts, but are unified in what we call a ‘person.’  
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shareable in nature.14 If shareable qualities or capacities that the person possesses, or potentially 
possesses, were sufficient to ground the dignity of persons, then one could allow for those 
persons’ replaceability. If we respond, with Zagzebski, that the person is incommunicable in 
his/her value, then this gives us the uniqueness we need in order to talk about the richness of 
dignity. What, then, is this incommunicable aspect of persons that gives them unique value? 
Karol Wojtyla identifies it as subjectivity or lived experience that is irreducible to analysis. 
Similar to what Gabriel Marcel says when he distinguishes between having and being, we can 
say that the experiences I have are uniquely mine and no one else’s. To come to know the subject 
takes time and love. Hence one way epistemically to have access to the unique value of the 
person is through love and friendship.  
 
III. Groundwork for Further Research in Developing a Richer View of Human 
Nature 
In our attempt to come up with a rich and robust concept of dignity, the aim is to protect 
not only those human persons who are functioning properly but also the vulnerable. Due to the 
limited scope of this thesis paper, I will not be able to get into the rich philosophical 
anthropology which deals with the mind and body as essential to who we are as human persons.  
In fact, I do not think that philosophy alone can do the job of accounting for all aspects of 
personhood, especially when it comes to the vulnerable. The reason why is because of the 
nebulous nature of a ‘who’ vs. a ‘what.’ Though the nature of what I am researching is obscure, 
nevertheless it can be supplemented by a theological framework. My hunch is that the 
                                                 
14 Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons." “The suggestion, then, is that what is irreplaceable about a 
person is something non-qualitative that nobody else has or even could have. It is also possible that a person can 
have this before he has gained the power of self -consciousness and after he has lost it.” 
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philosophical discussion could greatly benefit from the theological discussion if the two were to 
connect in some fashion or other. Theologians such as Karol Wojtyla have done work in this 
area; examples found are in his works: Love and Responsibility and the Theology of the Body. 
 
IV. The Position 
The position I will be taking throughout this thesis is this: All human beings have infinite 
and irreplaceable value. These two aspects of value will be used interchangeably with dignity. 
The word ‘value’ refers to a moral normative concept, denoting something of worth. Now 
whether the moral worth of the human person comes in degrees is debatable, but insofar as I 
understand the human person, he/she does not admit of “degrees” precisely because of his/her 
infinite value and irreplaceability. This thesis will be a fleshing out of what the dignity of 
persons, so conceived, looks like. 
 
V. Limitations 
I will not primarily be dealing with the applied ethical questions such as abortion and 
euthanasia. Though I will not be spending a great deal of time with either issue, both are 
nevertheless important implications of what I am trying to do. Nor will I be spending much time 
discussing the relationship between being a human being and being a person, though in the last 
chapter of this thesis I will briefly touch upon that conversation. To understand the relationship 
between those two concepts requires a long discussion of the metaphysics of human persons. If, 
for example, someone argues from a Thomist starting point that the person is grounded in an 
individual substance of a rational nature, then it would follow that the person functions as the 
whole human being. The two aspects are conceptual and not things in themselves, for if the self 
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and the body are two distinct things, then one has a Cartesian understanding of the ‘self.’  In 
chapter three of this thesis paper, I will be referring to Gabriel Marcel for a critique of the 
Cartesian self. Marcel does not deny that the body and self can be divided, but he argues that 
such a division represents an unnatural level of being human. 
 
VI. Development of Thesis 
Given the above discussion, chapter one will set the stage for our search for the two 
aspects of dignity; the irreplaceability and infinite value of the human person. Starting with 
Boethius, we will flesh out what it means to be an ‘individual substance of a rational nature.’ 
How are persons distinct from other things in the world? What is the distinction between a 
human being and a human person? What does the concept personhood add to that of a human 
being? Does it add dignity? Is it a status that all human beings have or only some? These 
questions will be asked in light of Boethius’s definition of personhood. The latter will be the 
ground from which we work to build up a concept of dignity.  
 
Locke builds upon Boethius by arguing that the person is of a rational nature and has the 
capacity for self-consciousness. By adding the latter dimension, Locke provides us with a deeper 
reason for why we love persons rather than non-persons. It seems that we do not love persons for 
their capacity to reason but for the fact that they are presently aware of themselves as persons. 
Does Locke give us the definition of dignity we are looking for? Can we tie the capacity for self-
consciousness to what is special about the human being? This seems to bring us closer to our 
constitution as subjects but does it account for the inviolability of the human being? Even with 
this capacity, it seems that Locke does not go far enough in his definition of the dignity of the 
17 
 
person since we can, with Peter Singer, explain away that capacity as being instantiated in 
someone else and hence replaceable.  
 
Kant seems to think that Locke brings us closer to the definition of the dignity of persons. 
Kant argues that dignity resides in the person’s rational will; that is, the human person is 
understood as special because of his/her capacity to set ends for oneself. Kant believes that this 
capacity is the ground of dignity because, if one has it, then one cannot will that the person be a 
mere means to an end, but also an end in itself. To will that the person be a mere means to an end 
is to undermine the very ground of determining means and ends, viz., that person’s rational 
nature. The categorical imperative only makes sense if there is a person who is willing such an 
imperative; if all laws are derived from the will and that will is a good will, then it follows that it 
cannot be a mere means to an end but an end in itself.  
 Kant’s argument is interesting, but does it provide us with the unconditional, absolute 
worth of the human person? He thinks that it does, but what is special about the ‘rational will?’ 
Does one have to exercise this capacity in order to be worthy of dignity? Similar to our criticism 
of Boethius and Locke, the question still remains, ‘What is so special about this person’s rational 
capacity?’ Peter Singer regards capacities as insufficient to account for the irreplaceability of 
human persons since one can think of instances in which one might lose one’s capacities, and 
therewith, one’s personhood.  
 
Given the insufficiency of capacities as the ground for the uniqueness of human persons, 
in chapter two we will attempt to develop an account of the unique aspect of dignity. We will 
first look at Aristotle’s account of friendship, viz., his account of friends who are goods, or ends, 
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in themselves. Aristotle’s account will provide something that we are looking for – a way to 
come to know persons as unique and infinitely valuable in themselves.  
Upon completion of our analysis of Aristotle, we will look at Neera Kapur Badhwar’s 
analysis of friends as ends-in-themselves. Given that Aristotle correctly distinguishes between 
different kinds of friendship, Badhwar will add another texture or layer to the conversation by 
arguing that friends are unique and irreplaceable because of the historical development that can 
be found between two good friends. This historical dimension of friendship determines the value 
of the person in the friendship – the friend is valued is because of our shared history. This 
historical aspect of the friendship cannot be shared by any other person. Given that the friend is 
the only one with this specific property, viz., friend-that-shares-this-history-with-me, we can say 
that the friend is, in him/herself, unique and irreplaceable. The identification of this property that 
both friends possess is one that is irreplaceable since it can be instantiated in no one else. 
Badhwar argues for a concept of irreplaceability on which a person’s essential qualities are 
inseparable from his/her historical identity.15  
The problem with the preceding account of friendship, however, continues to be that of 
identifying the friend with his/her properties. It is also interesting to note that in attempting to 
account for the irreplaceable aspect of persons as individuals, Badhwar comes up short in 
accounting for their shareable, universal, infinite value. But as regards the “property” aspect of 
personhood, if the person is merely the aggregate of his/her properties, then we have the problem 
that David Hume came up against – viz., that the bundle of properties just is the human person. 
The puzzling question, then, is how to account for both aspects of dignity, that which is 
shareable and that which is un-shareable. 
                                                 
15 See Badhwar’s article Friends as Ends in Themselves for more details, esp. pg.19.  
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In attempting to account for the irreplaceability and the infinite value of the person, 
Velleman develops Kant’s definition. To alleviate the problem to which we have already alluded, 
Velleman argues that Kant is on the right track by pointing out that dignity is grounded in the 
ideal rational will, but argues that he is missing a key phenomenological aspect of dignity, viz., 
what it is that we love when we love a person. Is it the fact that the person has the capacity to 
legislate ends for himself? Or is the person loved because he is this person? How do we account 
for both the particular person and the ideal rational will that all persons possess? Velleman 
argues that we can account for the uniqueness of persons by appreciating the person as a 
particular individual and judge him/her to have dignity by virtue of his/her rational will. The way 
we come to appreciate the particular person is through the epistemic vehicle of love. To love, in 
other words, is to stand in awe of the dignity of the person – the person having the rational 
capacity to will ends for his/herself. We, epistemically, come to stand in awe of the person’s 
capacity through the particular person which accounts for both the uniqueness and the infinite 
value that human beings possess.   
The problem we will find with Velleman’s account is his definition of what makes a 
person unique. He argues that all human persons are unique, but only by virtue of their capacity 
to set ends for themselves. The love by which we come to value the particular individual is not a 
valuing of the person for his/her uniqueness, but solely for his/her capacities. It seems, as will be 
argued, that Velleman does not go much further in his analysis than Kant does. To account for 
the coherency of both aspects of dignity we will need to look elsewhere. The problem, I will 
suggest, might be that we are starting off on the wrong philosophical foot; it could be that our 
methodology for how we come to understand the concept of dignity is flawed.   
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Up until this point, the problem seems to reside in finding the irreplaceable aspect of the 
human person. We have seen that Boethius, Locke, Kant, Aristotle, Badhwar, and Velleman all 
understand that there is something infinitely valuable about the human person, namely, the 
capacities to do x, y and z. These capacities set human persons off from the rest of nature but are 
found and analyzed as though they were natural objects. The human person is not only a ‘what’ 
but a ‘who.’ When we ask for someone’s name we want to know that person’s name and not 
another; when we address the person as an ‘it’ we are not taking into account the ‘thou.’  
 
The nature of friendship has shown us the importance of this irreplaceable intuition that 
we have in our close friendships; it gave us reasons for why we think our loved ones are really 
irreplaceable. The problem, it seems, is the difficultly in accounting for our loved ones being 
really irreplaceable. This intuition seems to point in the direction of methodology and the nature 
of concepts themselves. In chapter three of this thesis, following Karol Wojtyla and Gabriel 
Marcel, it will be argued that the reason we think the person is irreplaceable in dignity is because 
the human person, unlike natural objects, cannot be reduced to concepts. The question that will 
be raised will concern our epistemic starting point: Where do we start our analysis of the human 
person and his/her dignity? The problem until now has been that we began with the assumption 
that we can only know the human person conceptually. Karol Wojtyla will argue that we need to 
look at what he calls ‘lived experience,’ the level of existence that is non-conceptual. Marcel will 
fill in the gaps when we look at his distinction of ‘mystery’ vs. ‘problem.’ Gabriel Marcel, an 
existentialist, will show how we mistakenly start with concepts without reference to the non-
conceptual experience from which those concepts arose. To put it differently, the starting point 
ought to be from our being-in-a-situation rather than from the standpoint of pure concepts.  
21 
 
Given our intuition of our friends as irreplaceable in dignity, it may be that the reason 
why is because they are in principle irreplaceable by virtue of our concrete experiences of them. 
When we experience human persons in the phenomenological sense, we can say that they are 
irreplaceable because we experience them as such.16 It is similar to the problem in epistemology 
of finding a foundation for our most basic beliefs. In attempting to explain why the beliefs are at 
bottom basic we appeal to the fact that they are basic. The only way out of this epistemic circle is 
to appeal to our non-conceptual experiences. It seems that, given chapters one and two, Marcel’s 
explanation of the nature of the person as irreplaceable is on the right track.  
 
Given Marcel’s analysis of the irreducibility of the person to bare concepts, how are we 
to tie the knot between these two aspects of dignity, irreplaceability and infinite value, grounding 
them in the same human person? Assuming that we are correct in concluding that there are two 
aspects of dignity, how are we to show that both can be said of the same thing? Linda Zagzebski 
will argue that both aspects cannot be grounded in the same logical subject since that which is 
shareable in nature, the capacities of the human person, cannot be grounded in something un-
sharable, subjectivity. Chapter four will explore ways in which we can ground both aspects in the 
selfsame subject. It will be argued, contrary to Zagzebski, that we can understand both aspects of 
dignity as grounded in a metaphysical subject. In response to Zagzebski, the two ways of talking 
about dignity should not be two distinct types of properties of the human person (shareable vs. 
un-shareable) but two different aspects of the same thing. What we have here is a paradox, not an 
                                                 
16 Someone might object that experience is not sufficient to account for the irreplaceability of the person. In 
response, I would argue that we need to understand ‘experience’ as something that is non-conceptual, something 
grounded in intuition. If I were to ‘see’ a tree without making an inference, I would be seeing-something-treely. The 
important distinction here is between my experience and the inference I make in making a judgment about the tree 
being green and so forth.  
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inconsistency, communicability vs. incommunicability. By ‘incommunicable’ I mean something 
that is mysterious and difficult to grasp conceptually. As we saw with Marcel, the human person 
is both a ‘mystery’ and a ‘problem.’ As an example: If I ask my friend Nathan’s help with fixing 
my car, he knows what I am referring to by virtue of the universal understanding of what ‘car’ 
means. But the concept “car” does not exhaust this car’s reality, for I have a unique 
understanding of this car – it is the car in which I asked my wife to marry me.  Are these two 
aspects of the car inconsistent? Of course not – we are merely speaking of it in two different 
modes of epistemic activity, objective vs. relational.  
To substantiate the above claim, we will look at Karol Wojtyla’s analysis that ties the two 
aspects together into a single whole. Wojtyla will argue that the two aspects of the human person 
are known by two different activities of the person. Activities involve relations with things. For 
example, when I am consciously aware, I am always aware of something. One aspect of the 
human person is his/her subjectivity; this is what grounds our awareness of the irreplaceability of 
human persons. This aspect of the human person is grounded in the individual substance of a 
rational nature. But clearly the subject cannot be objectified or else it would not be a subject. It 
will be argued that subjectivity must be assumed on pain of becoming involved in an infinite 
regress, since if there is no subject, there can be no object. This subject cannot be fully grasped, 
but it can be touched by virtue of our being ‘self-present.’ The person, then, is not identified with 
any one activity or capacity, nor with subjectivity itself. Personhood is not to be identified with 
one of its aspects, but with the whole of what it is. Thus the human person is both subject and 
object, incommunicable in terms of particularity and communicable in terms of shared nature 
and properties, unique and universal, and possessing infinite value that derives from one’s 
irreplaceability as well as the nature that one shares with other human persons.   
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CHAPTER 1: 
BOETHIUS, LOCKE, KANT AND THE CAPACITIES OF THE PERSON 
 
        
When we think of persons as being valuable what is it about them that causes us to deem 
them valuable? More specifically what is it about human persons that gives them a special status 
in comparison to the aspidistra sitting on my kitchen counter? Intuitively speaking, we would 
grant a higher value to human persons than an aspidistra plant. Let us take an example: If I were 
to walk into my kitchen and find my aspidistra plant upside down on the floor, I would be a little 
flustered because I have to clean up the dirt off the floor. But if my wife were on the floor 
unconscious next to the aspidistra plant, my attention would turn immediately to my wife. My 
vision would be ‘tunnel vision,’ turning my whole being to my wife and attending to her needs. 
The plant in this scenario would feel to me as though it were valueless in comparison to my 
wife.17  
Given our intuitions about human persons and their value, what are we to say about this 
value that we intuitively grasp? What makes something valuable? What makes persons valuable? 
For direction and guidance I suggest we explore Kant’s notion that what makes something 
valuable is its being raised above all price. That which is raised above all price is also 
irreplaceable since it admits of no equivalence. He defines dignity as such: 
                                                 
17 Of course we could add more persons to the scenario making it more difficult for me (one person) to 
attend to the need of many persons but nonetheless we would not say one is deficient in value in comparison to the 
other persons. My attitude towards my wife would be one of a stronger love than towards a stranger and hence I 
would attend to my wife’s needs first. But the example does not take away the intuition of the value of persons in 
general, for I would not feel as if the other persons are valueless in comparison to my wife. Many utilitarian 
scenarios have the feature of having more than one person to attend to, but given the Principle of Double Effect we 
can say that my intention was to save all persons in the context above. Cf. Trolley problems and other thought 
experiments. For a good historical study on the doctrine of double effect, see: Joseph Mangan, "An Historical 
Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect," Theological Studies 10(1949). For a good analysis of the trolley 
problem see: Judith Jarvis Thomson, "The Trolley Problem," The Yale Law Journal 94, no. 6 (1985). 
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In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can be 
replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all 
price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity (42).18 
 
 Given the above understanding of the dignity of persons, what features set human persons 
off from the rest of natural objects? What does Kant mean when he says something that is raised 
above all price? Zagzebski interprets ‘raised above all price’ as meaning ‘infinite value’. That 
which has infinite value is something that does not admit of any market price. If something has 
infinite value then it entails that same thing to be irreplaceable. For Zagzebski interprets Kant as 
saying that anything that has dignity is more valuable than anything that has a price. It entails 
irreplaceability because anything that does not admit of a price is also something that cannot be 
compared. The two concepts are logically connected for Kant but not conceptually identical. 
Zagzebski argues that something can be infinitely valuable and yet have another equivalent. 
Given that it is in fact possible to distinguish something being infinitely valuable and 
irreplaceable we can say that if something is infinitely valuable it does not follow that it is 
irreplaceable in value. 19   
 When we arrive at chapter four, I will argue that Zagzebski’s starting point of inquiry is 
part of the reason why she finds the two concepts incompatible. For the purpose of this chapter, 
it should suffice that we have a distinction between the two concepts of dignity.  
 
I. Boethius: Persons and Rationality  
                                                 
18 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
 
19 Zagzebski points out that it the infinite value is logically connected with irreplaceability but she will 
argue that they are conceptually incompatible. I will argue in chapter five of this thesis paper that the concepts are in 
fact compatible by virtue of a substance metaphysics.  
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Historically, Boethius seems to give us a starting point in coming to understand what a 
person is – what makes a person infinitely valuable compared to the rest of the objects we find in 
the world.20 Starting with Boethius’s definition of persons, individual substance of a rational 
nature, we can see how persons are set off from non-persons.21This definition gives us a starting 
point in understanding how persons are distinct from non-persons.  
What then do we mean by rationality? Rationality can be thought of as solving a problem, 
thinking of an explanation, doing conceptual analysis, participating in mathematical reasoning, 
or thinking of logical possibilities. These and other such activities seem to point out the essence 
of being a person. But is this sufficient? It seems, as Linda Zagzebski points out, that rationality 
lacks an explanation as to why persons act this way rather than another.  There seems to be 
something deeper that is needed to explain why we act rationally than not. What about those who 
are do not exhibit signs of rationality? Are we to merely say they potentially have the capacity to 
reason? I think Zagzebski is correct, there seems to be something more to a person than mere 
rationality.  
 
II. John Locke: Persons and Self-Consciousness  
John Locke, who is building off of Boethius’s definition of the person, defines a person 
as,  
                                                 
20 The reason why we are starting with Boethius is to set the historical stage for how the term was used and 
what it means for us today. By looking for the sources of dignity historically, we can attain a better grasp of what we 
mean by something having infinite value – that is, is the assumption correct that the human capacities to reason are 
the grounding for infinite value? What about irreplaceable value? 
 
21 In Boethius’s Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius Boethius defines a person as ‘the individual 
substance of a rational creature.’ By individual substance, Boethius means something that underlies the essential and 
accidental properties of a thing. The nature of a thing is what it is. In this context Boethius is responding to 
Nestorius in his rendering of Christ and his two natures as being two persons (85). What is interesting is that the 
distinction between person and nature is one in which can be applied to God, angels and human beings. Peter Singer 
on the other hand uses this theological distinction to apply personhood to other animals.  
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…a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, the 
same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that 
consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and seems to me essential to it; it being 
impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.22 
 
 The person is defined as one who thinks about the act of thinking and is not merely one 
who actually thinks. The self-consciousness aspect of persons is important to distinguish us from 
a ‘what.’ For Boethius’s definition gave us a start by stating that persons are essentially rational 
but it does not single out what is most meaningful about human persons. When I reflect on my 
thoughts I am thinking about something that is personally myself. When I reflect on my 
memories I am referring to something in which I participated that contribute to who I am as a 
human person.23 
 
A. Locke: A Building Block for Grasping What is Most Intimate About Persons 
 This personal identity could not be found in Boethius’s definition for he is merely labeling 
the world and its objects. As such, we need to supplement Boethius’s definition of persons by 
adding the capacity for self-consciousness. For rationality seems to be more personal than merely 
doing calculations. There is something intimate when I come to understand something rather 
than merely a ‘what’ coming to understand something. Though the definition seems to add a 
richer dimension to the concept of persons, it nevertheless is not sufficient to capture why 
persons are considered unique and irreplaceable. For what is so special about self-reflective 
                                                 
22 John Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding," in Philosophic Classics : Modern 
Philosophy, ed. F. Baird (Prentice Hall, 2010). Pg.445-446. 
 
23 For a critique of Locke’s theory of personal identity read Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual 
Powers of Man  (Edinburgh University Press, 2002). Pg. 276. Richard Swinburne also critiques Locke on what he 
calls the “memory theory of identity.” Richard Swinburne, "Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory " in 
Metaphysics : The Big Questions, ed. Peter and Zimmerman Van Inwagen, Dean W. (Malden, MA Blackwell 2008). 
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activity? What gives such activity an inviolable value? As a counterexample to show the 
insufficiency of such a definition, we can point out those who cannot or do not exercise their 
capacity for self-conscious activity. The severely cognitively disabled and very small children 
would be good instances where the above definition is found lacking in ontological weight. The 
self-consciousness aspect of persons, though important, does not capture in its entirety what we 
mean when we say that all persons have dignity. Maybe Kant can show us where we went wrong 
in our analysis.  
 
 
III. Kant: Persons and the Capacity to Set Ends for Oneself  
 
A. The Argument Leading Up to Persons as Ends-In-Themselves: 
 
We started this chapter with a discussion on Kant’s distinction between something having 
infinite value and irreplaceable value.24 In this section we will explore more deeply whether Kant 
can account for both aspects of dignity. If dignity, in both aspects, is grounded in capacities, then 
does it matter what capacities both aspects are grounded in? Let us look at what Kant’s definition 
of person is and see if his definition can account for both aspects of dignity.   
What does Kant mean by person or persons? 25  The latter question is a loaded one 
because for Kant the person is not an Aristotelian substance but rather a rational being. For the 
latter to make sense it would be a good idea to look at how Kant conceives of the will as being 
unconditionally good. By analyzing the will we can then come to a better understanding of what 
Kant means by a person as being an end-in-itself.   
                                                 
24 Refer back to page 24 of this paper for more details. 
 
25 Personhood is a term hardly used by Kant, but if I am right I think he would use ‘rational nature’ or 
‘humanity’ as interchangeable terms with persons/personhood or person.  
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What does Kant mean by a ‘good will?’ He says, “It is impossible to think of anything at 
all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation 
except a good will (7).”26 For Kant, a good will is not something that is governed by anything 
except the self, for the self is what gives the laws and is what submits to them (44). For the will 
to be a good will it must be unconditionally good by formulating a maxim that, if made into a 
universal law, would not conflict with itself. To make what I just said clearer, I think it would be 
best if I quoted Kant himself, “[A]ct in accordance with maxims that can at the same time have 
as their object themselves as universal laws of nature (44).” For the concept of a good will to be 
possible it must have no other end but itself qua rational nature. If the will were to set ends that 
were only instrumentally good then it would follow that the will is instrumentally good, but for a 
will to be absolutely good it must act from reverence to reason itself. To so act is to act from 
duty and not merely in conformity with duty.27 We could also say that acting from duty implies 
that one is acting out of respect for the law and not out of any other inclination.  
Why is the above discussion on the good will important for our inquiry into what Kant 
thought about persons? For one, Kant is going to ground his metaphysics of morals in the 
autonomous agent. For Kant, in order for the will to be unconditionally good it must not have 
any external influences upon it, causing it to become heteronomous. Kant says,  
If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its 
maxims for its own giving of universal law—consequently if, in going beyond itself, it 
seeks this law in a property of any of its objects—heteronomy always results.28 
 
                                                 
26 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 7. 
 
27 “…though much may be done in conformity with what duty commands, still it is always doubtful whether 
it is really done from duty and therefore has moral worth (19).” For Kant the moral law ought to be obeyed by virtue 
of having respect for the universal law; all other inclinations or feelings are not sufficient for an action to be good in 
and of itself.   
 
28 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 47. 
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In other words, if the person wills an end for the sake of some other object than the 
universal law itself, then heteronomy results. Why is this the case? Given that Kant has already 
discussed the categorical imperative, which says “Act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law,” we can say that this 
is where the unconditional aspect of the will is made manifest. The absolute goodness of the will 
consists in the willing of a categorical imperative.  
Secondly, the discussion about the good will gives the rational agent worth so that it is an 
end in itself and not of another. Again, if the will is an end for some other purpose than for itself, 
then it is not intrinsically valuable.  
The will is thought as a capacity to determine itself to acting in conformity with the 
representation of certain laws. And such a capacity can be found only in rational 
beings…the ends that a rational being proposes at his discretion as effects of his actions 
(material ends) are all only relative; for only their mere relation to a specially constituted 
faculty of desire on the part of the subject gives them worth...But suppose there were 
something the  existence of which in itself has an absolute worth, something which as an 
end in itself could be the ground of determinate laws; then in it…would lie the ground of 
a possible categorical imperative.29 
 
  For Kant, the will is the key to this discussion on the value of persons since it is that 
which sets ends for the rational agent. If the will is infinitely valuable, that is, if it does not admit 
of a price, then it has dignity and hence cannot be violated by another rational agent (42). 
Conversely, if the will sets an end that is not out of respect for the law, then it is acting contrary 
to what it was designed to do.   
 
 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 36. 
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B. Persons and Their Absolute Value/Dignity 
Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in 
itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion; instead he 
must in all his actions, whether directed towards himself or also to other rational beings, 
always be regarded at the same time as an end (37). 30 
 
Human beings are ends-in-themselves because they are objective ends. By objective ends 
Kant means, “beings the existence of which is in itself an end, and indeed one such that no other 
end, to which they would serve merely as means, can be put in its place, since without it nothing 
of absolute worth would be found anywhere (37)…” The concept of the good will supplies that 
which is of unconditional value since it, and only it, is able to legislate and submit to universal 
law. A will could not do so if there were no rational nature existing as an end in itself. Now, if all 
laws are derived from the will, and that will is a good will—that is to say, a rational will—then it 
follows that it cannot be a means to an end but is an end in and of itself.  
When Kant speaks about dignity, he speaks of it as applied to only rational beings. Why? In 
the kingdom of ends, that is, “a systematic union of various rational beings through common 
laws (41),” only rational beings can be members since it is only they that give and submit to 
those laws. Such a kingdom is possible only though freedom of the will. The fact that rational 
beings can give themselves laws makes them absolute ends. Hence, dignity resides not in the 
human being as an occult property to be recognized by others but rather has to do with the 
rational person being a legislator and a member of the kingdom of ends. So, what is the ground 
of dignity? This law-giving capacity, autonomy, is “the ground of the dignity of human nature 
and of every rational nature (43).” 
                                                 
30 This quote is the pinnacle of Kant’s moral philosophy and one that has helped develop discussions on 
human rights and bioethical issues. Examples of the latter’s contribution to human rights issues can be found in the 
universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and in the political writings of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. 
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C. Given Kant’s Definition of Dignity, Who is a Person?  
 Given the above analysis, it is clear that Kant would find the moral status of personhood 
in the capacity to set ends for oneself from reason. The capacity to will is to freely act in 
accordance with the law, from duty, and at the same time to legislate for oneself such a law. If 
the latter is the criterion for the dignity of persons, however, can we say that infants are persons? 
Are other animals or are severely disabled human beings persons? From what I read of Kant, I 
cannot say that he talked much about human beings except in terms of their possessing a rational 
nature. It seems that Kant would place infants as worthy of absolute value due to the fact that 
they could potentially become autonomous persons. Even if we were to grant that within Kant’s 
moral theory we can account for infants and their potential capacity to sets ends for themselves, 
can we say the same thing about those who will never be able to become autonomous, fully 
rational? It seems we need something else here to account for such persons. Would mere 
sentience and having a will that is not rational in Kant’s sense be sufficient conditions for those 
that lack the capacity to set ends for themselves? Maybe, but then we would have to allow for 
some non-humans to be persons. The latter does not seem intuitive.  
Would Kant use such language as potency or actuality to speak of persons? I am not sure; 
I think the main point for Kant is that dignity is not found in any other object other than the 
rational being itself. For if we were to find the dignity of persons in the concept of perfection or 
the divine will we would be heteronomous and hence have not an unconditional good will (G 48-
49). Does it make sense to find dignity anywhere else other than the actual unconditional good 
will or is there something else like a potential unconditional good will? 
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D. Are Persons more than the Sum of their Capacities?  
If, according to Kant, persons are rational beings who are autonomous, then how ought 
we to understand the value of persons as distinguished from things. Kant says,  
Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they are beings 
without reason, still have only relative worth, as means, and are therefore called things 
[Sachen], whereas rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks 
them out as an end in itself, that is, as something that may not be used merely as a means, 
and hence so far limits all choice (and is an object of respect) (G 37). 
 
The distinction made by Kant between persons and things is a key distinction; it provides 
us with a framework as to distinguish persons over things. Even though the latter distinction is 
made by Kant, I still find something missing; if I were to say that, according to Kant’s definition, 
a  newborn infant were a potential person and as such he/she is infinitely valuable, then to 
commit infanticide would be immoral. Even if the person was a potential person and not an 
actual person, the same problem would persist- is the new-born infant replaceable or not? The 
potential capacity-to-set-ends-for-oneself does not seem to prevent infanticide. That is, given that 
persons in Kant’s ‘Kingdom of Ends’ all ‘participate’ in the creation of categorical imperatives, 
then it would seem that persons are replaceable. Why? What is it about having a rational nature 
that provides the person with an irreplaceable value? I understand why persons, according to 
Kant, are infinite in value, but what about their being irreplaceably valuable?  
To make myself clearer I suggest that we think of something that could be infinitely 
valuable and yet replaceable. Linda Zagzebski gives a good example of the latter when she says, 
“a world containing life is infinitely better than a world without life. But it is still possible that all 
living organisms could be replaced by similar organisms without the loss of value.”31 Subjective 
                                                 
31 Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons." 
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experiences are akin to this; for example, the memory I have of fishing with my dad in the Rocky 
Mountains is infinitely valuable and cannot be exchanged with anything higher in value, but it 
can be exchanged with something that is also infinitely valuable such as another memory that is 
similar in form and content.32   
In the case of something being irreplaceable, we could say that Dali’s Christ of St. John 
of the Cross painting is something that admits of a degree of finite value but is irreplaceable; for 
it was painted at a specific time and is located in a specific place. Given that there are things that 
are irreplaceable, why can we not say the same thing about persons? Given that Kant imagines 
that all persons have this capacity to act for ends, there does not seem to be anything unique 
about this capacity; hence persons are replaceable.  
Overall I think Kant is right that persons do have rational capacities to act for ends and 
that by virtue of that we can say that they are infinitely valuable. But as to whether persons are 
replaceable or irreplaceable is difficult to adjudicate when reading Kant. In the previous section I 
proposed a problem for Kant’s moral philosophy to account for. However, I think that Kant’s 
understanding of personhood can be supplemented by those of other philosophers. The moral 
intuitions seem to be that persons are: (1) infinitely valuable and (2) irreplaceable. I think Kant 
found the source of personhood in the former, but not the latter.  
 From Boethius to Kant we find that dignity seems to be something a person has; that is, 
dignity seems to be grounded in some capacity that a person possesses that makes them infinitely 
valuable. But going back to our first example of my wife being found unconscious on our 
                                                 
32 I will argue with Gabriel Marcel that such a thought experiment is meaningless since it lacks the self who 
had such memory. Memories are not things that can be exchanged as if they were material goods! The memories I 
have of fishing with my dad are not merely mental properties that can be manipulated by logic since there is 
something intimately myself in those memories, such that to divorce myself from those memories would be logically 
possible but humanly undesirable.  
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kitchen floor, I do not want to say that because of her capacities x, y, and z that she is deserving 
of help and care. No, it seems that there is something more going on here; it seems there is 
something that I love and respect in my wife despite her incapacitated state in the proposed 
scenario that requires self-sacrifice on my part. It does not seem that anyone would sacrifice their 
time and effort for mere capacities that a person possesses. Some persons do not have such 
capacities, or if they do have them, they are not exercised to their highest degree. I do not love 
my wife because she is an individual substance of a rational nature who has the capacity for self-
conscious activity and setting ends for herself. No, it seems that I love my wife because she is my 
wife and there is a history of relations that are unique between me and her. That being said, it 
seems that we have to look elsewhere to account for such uniqueness of persons.33  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 For a different analysis than what I offered of Kant, see Christopher  Gowans, "Intimacy, Freedom, and 
Unique Value: A" Kantian" Account of the Irreplaceable and Incomparable Value of Persons," American 
Philosophical Quarterly (1996). 
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CHAPTER 2: 
FRIENDSHIP, LOVE AND THE UNIQUE VALUE OF PERSONS 
 
 
Referring back to the concrete situation found in chapter one in which my wife was lying 
unconscious on our kitchen floor, we would not say that I ought to attend to her care because she 
has the capacity for reason or self-consciousness, or even because she has the capacity to set 
goals for herself. No, it seems that a better explanation of why I ought to attend immediately to 
her needs is because I love her. This love does not seem to be directed towards capacities that 
she potentially or actually possesses, rather, it seems that my love is directed towards something 
deeper than anything said about her.34 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the object of our 
love, the person seen as irreplaceable. We will explore (1) the phenomena of the close 
friendships we have with other persons, (2) the intuition of someone being irreplaceable due to 
our experiences of friendship with that person qua person, and (3) and the experiences we have 
of someone being unique in how we come to value the person for his/her own sake and not for 
the sake of another.  
 
In our definition of dignity we ought to include not only the value that every human 
person shares but also the unique value which is found in personal, intimate relationships. In 
looking at the unique value found in these personal and intimate relationships, it will help us to 
better understand not only who persons are but what motivates us to love them for their own 
sake. In showing how human persons can be loved for their own sake we will also see what it 
would look like if the human person were not loved for his/her own sake but for another end.  
                                                 
34 It could be objected that it would not be possible to make that value judgment if I did not have the 
capacity to reason, judge, or be self-aware. But this objection misses the point, which is not whether it is possible to 
make such a judgment, but what is the object of our love.  
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In this chapter we will look at the various theories surrounding friendship and its structure. We 
will access and evaluate which theory of friendship seems to work best in accounting for this 
unique value and which one does not. The key here is trying to stay as close to our everyday 
intimate encounters with our loved ones; staying close to the phenomena of love between 
persons. For in doing so we do justice to not only our loved ones but to other human persons as 
well.35 My goal in this chapter is to provide us with some concrete experiences which will testify 
to the uniqueness of persons, especially those who are closest to us. In exploring the different 
aspects of friendship and love, the following questions will arise: What is this irreplaceable 
element found in these experiences of friendship?  Why ought I to treat this person as a Thou 
rather than an it? What does it mean to be a Thou?  
 
I. Explorations on Love and Friendship: The Search for the Uniqueness of Persons  
 
A. Aristotle on Friendship: Loving Persons qua Persons 
 
When we speak about love we are referring to different loveable objects. Our attitude 
towards the loveable objects determines what our end or goal is. For example if I chose to be 
friends with someone for the sake of pleasure, then I am not choosing them as persons as the 
goal but rather I am choosing the pleasure that arises out of the friendship with him or her.  
Aristotle makes this distinction when speaking about the different kinds of friendship, 
 
Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves but 
in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So too with those who love for 
the sake of pleasure; it is not for their character that men love ready-witted people, but 
because they find them pleasant…And thus these friendships are only incidental for it is 
not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved but in so far as he is useful or 
pleasant…. Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good and alike in virtue; 
                                                 
 
35 For a good survey of various problems with the Uniqueness Thesis see, Christopher Grau, "The 
Irreplaceability of Persons" (Ph.D. diss, The Johns Hopkins University, 2003). 
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for these wish well alike to each other qua good, for they are good in themselves. Now 
those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this 
by reason of their own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long 
as they are good—and goodness is an enduring thing.36 
 
Given the above, we can delineate three kinds of friendship. First, there is the friendship 
aimed at utility. For Aristotle, friendship is possible only on the assumption that there is 
reciprocity or exchange of goodwill, for no one can be friends with someone whom they do not 
know about. There must then be an exchange of good feelings and aims towards the loveable 
object. The reasons given to the other will correspond to the different kinds of friendship.  
For the first kind, we see that friendship is based on utility/use of something and once 
that something is achieved then it follows that the friendship has no other reason to exist. For 
example, if I were to go to an interview for a potential job and during the interview the 
interviewer inquired into my talents and abilities, I would list every one that I would think 
apropos to doing the job well. Unbeknownst to me, I get the job and gain a good relationship 
with my boss. That friendship lasts only as long as the work is done well. In other words, the 
relationship with my boss is a friendship only insofar as I meet or exceed his expectations. The 
latter is an example of a friendship based on utility.  
The second kind of friendship is one that is based on pleasure. Aristotle mentions that this 
type of friendship is usually manifested in younger people, for younger people tend to seek more 
after pleasure and are, generally speaking, more generous than old people. Whether or not the 
latter is true is not in question. We can say that the friendship is a friendship if and only if it 
produces pleasure for both friends; notice here that friendship is not for the other’s sake but for 
one’s own sake. In my younger days I had friends that had the same interests as myself and I 
                                                 
36 Aristotle NE 1156a-1156b (1060-1061). 
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found myself enjoying their company for the sake of the pleasure that arose from it. As a 
consequence, as my interests changed, so did my friends.  
The third kind of friendship is one which I find most intriguing, especially in light of our 
discussion on the value of persons. What Aristotle calls the perfect friendship is a friendship that 
is aimed at each other as persons. The good sought after in this relationship is not pleasure nor 
utility but the person him/herself. The good found in the other is the good found in oneself. The 
difficultly we will encounter is whether Aristotle is correct in grounding the love of persons in 
their good qualities and virtues. For, can one not imagine a good person being replaced by 
another qualitatively good person, yet with something nevertheless missing from the 
friendship?37  
There does seem to be something missing from Aristotle’s account that is deeply 
ingrained in our phenomenological experiences of the person as a person. For my love of this 
particular person is qualitatively different from love of another person. Does it not seem that the 
love that I have for my wife transcends the qualities that she possesses, thereby requiring my full 
attention and fidelity? Whether she is virtuous or not I will love her, but then again we are at 
square one. What is it that I love, if not her character? If it is her character, then she seems to be 
replaceable and hence my intuition of persons as being irreplaceable is mere sentimentality. But 
maybe there is a distinction that is missing from our analysis of friendship, which takes us to a 
supplementary account of friendship by Badhwar.  
 
 
                                                 
37 George Nakhnikian in his article, “Love in Human Reason,” points out what he calls ‘undemanding love,’ which is 
not found in Aristotle’s account of friendship (with the exception of the unrequited love the mother has for her child), 293.  
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B. A Supplementation to Aristotle? Badhwar on Friendship 
In agreement with Aristotle, Badhwar wants to argue that pleasure and usefulness as 
effects of the friendship are important and provide a rich phenomenological description of what 
it means to be a friend in the most perfect sense. From our discussion above there still lurks the 
objection that the person loved is vulnerable to being replaced. For if the person is loved for 
her/his character, and if persons are only the sum of their qualities and character, then it would 
seem that they are replaceable.   
Badhwar, who sees the above deficiency with Aristotle’s understanding of good friends 
as ends in themselves, wants to substantiate the intuitions we have concerning our loved ones’ 
irreplaceability.38This, our loved ones being irreplaceable, is a widely held intuition and one in 
which we want to say that we treat our loved ones (in Aristotle’s perfect friendship sense) as 
ends in themselves and not as means to an end. Badhwar lays out a different way of thinking of 
the problem of replaceability of persons by saying that the essential qualities that are loved in a 
person are tightly bound up with that person’s historical and numerical identity. The object of 
love, in other words, is the essential person herself and that is just the historical and numerical 
identity of the person. For what else do we love about the person apart from her true self?39 
 What then does the above have to do with the friend’s being a unique and irreplaceable 
individual? Badhwar suggests that if we construe our understanding of love of the person as 
unconditional (that is, as independent of anything about her), then it would seem that the love has 
                                                 
38 Neera Kapur Badhwar, "Friends as Ends in Themselves," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
48, no. 1 (1987). 
 
39 Ibid. She says here, “A personal essence is not a set of qualities detached from one’s particular existence, 
but qualities which express, and are expressed in, this existence (19).”  
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a target but has no object/focus.40To put it more concretely; let us imagine a man walking down 
the street. Let us call this man Harry. Harry is interrupted by another man (let us call him John) 
who looks as if he needs some money. The homeless man, John, is startled and is thankful for the 
money being placed in his tin can. Harry made a choice, he acted out of love towards John for no 
reason other than to give money to a man whom he considered poor. The object/focus of his 
attention was not John himself as the individual person he is. In a sense, the object was nothing 
at all. There is no rich phenomenological description under which John could be understood as 
John.  
Another problem encountered in the discussion on the unique value of persons is 
instrumental love. Badhwar makes a distinction between instrumental friendships and end 
friendships; end friendships are understood to be the highest form of friendship whereas 
instrumental friendships are based on incidental qualities the person has. The latter kind of 
friendship implies a means-type-of-friendship, and hence, the person loved in the friendship is 
replaceable.41  
 The main idea I find in Badhwar as regards our discussion on the irreplaceability of 
persons is the historical component to our definition of personhood. Badhwar is pointing out 
something that Aristotle seems to be lacking in his account of friendship, for a person is more 
than a mere sum of qualities—rather, it is this person’s qualities and no one else’s which make 
her unique. The point of disagreement I find with Badhwar is the final definition of what a 
person is; that is, I disagree that the essential qualities of a friend are merely her numerical and 
                                                 
40 She refers to Amelie Rorty here for the distinction between target and object of love.  
41 Ibid.1-2. The friend in an instrumental friendship is replaceable because he/she is not loved for his/her 
historical and numerical identity. The key here is not the fact that the friendship is permanent or long-lasting in 
order to be irreplaceable, for the one loved could die and still be loved. Rather, the person is loved for 
himself/herself qua person. As we will see later in this chapter, the person needs to be more richly defined for our 
concept of dignity to account, not just for the particular individual, but for all persons.   
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historical identity. The important point here is that rich phenomenological descriptions of 
persons are essential for our loving them for their own sake, but not sufficient. Nonetheless, I 
think Badhwar is making an important point when she distinguishes loving someone 
unconditionally and loving the person by virtue of the particularity of her nature. The question is, 
what are those qualities that make a person loveable? Are all persons loveable by virtue of their 
uniqueness and unique history? The essential qualities as defined by Badhwar are those that 
make an individual an end in herself, but if a person is, as she puts it, “a mere vehicle for these 
qualities, [then] the concrete events in his life which give them shape and expression [are] mere 
accidents (21).” Hence, it would seem that a specific history, and the character forged by that 
history, are essential to the person whom we love and regard as irreplaceable, and that historical 
accidents have a role to play in this. 
 
C. Velleman: Love as Affirmation of One’s Value 
Badhwar’s analysis of friends being ends-in-themselves gives us reasons for why we love 
some persons rather than others but it does not provide us with an account of friendship that 
justifies us in saying that a person is in principle irreplaceable. The problem is this: if some 
persons are loved for their unique characteristics, or style, then what makes that particular person 
irreplaceable? Are not all human persons irreplaceable regardless of their unique characteristics? 
Even though we are historically tied to our loved ones in a unique way, that is, valuing them as 
irreplaceable, we have not argued to the conclusion that the loved one is in principle 
irreplaceable.  
In response to Aristotle and Badhwar, Velleman argues that all persons are to be loved as 
self-subsistent ends; that is, all persons are to be loved by virtue of their capacity to set ends for 
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themselves.42 Following Kant’s lead, Velleman further develops his discussion of the dignity of 
human persons. Velleman analyzes the respect that is demanded by the ideal rational will/the law 
and draws an analogy with the attitude of respect towards the law with the attitude of love 
towards the person who is essentially the ideal rational will.43 In other words, instead of 
understanding a person being irreplaceable by virtue of his unique characteristics grounded in the 
history shared with the lover, we instead should ‘see’ the person in his ideal rational will.  
 
What are we doing when we love someone? The distinction between judgment and 
appreciation of value is apropos here.44 For if we are to account for the particular person’s value 
as unique, and at the same time that same value is applicable to all persons, then we need to 
understand how love is the way/mode by which we come to appreciate the person as a particular 
individual and judge him/her to have a dignity by virtue of his/her rational will.45What then do 
we mean by loving the beloved? Velleman suggests that love is “…the awareness of a value in 
                                                 
42 J. David Velleman, "Love as a Moral Emotion," Ethics 109, no. 2 (1999). 
  
43 This discussion can be found in Velleman, 344-349. 
 
44 Velleman, "Love as a Moral Emotion." “When Kant says that an object with dignity “admits of no 
equivalents,” he is speaking about how to appreciate such an object, not how to judge it. Kant himself believes that 
each person has a dignity in virtue of his rational nature, and hence that all persons should be judged to have the 
same value. What he denies is that comparing or equating one person with another is an appropriate way of 
responding to that value. The value that we must attribute to a person imposes absolute constraints on our treatment 
of him, thus commanding a motivational response to the person in and by himself (367).”  
 
45 By rational will I mean what Kant means. Rational will is derived from his discussion on the person 
being respected as a law, in the abstract, ideal sense. The law is not merely a rule or code of conduct but rather for 
Kant is a rational will enacting or legislating the law. The rational will is the ideal (noumenal) and hence universal 
and applicable to all empirical persons. For in respecting the law I am respecting the person in him/herself. Why? 
Because in acting out of any other empirical motives (motives that stem from prudential or psychological desires) I 
am acting with a view to mere results and not out of respect for ends in themselves. For an end in itself is what Kant 
calls a self-subsistent end. The self-subsistent end cannot be subsumed under any other end because in doing so it 
would admit of a conditional understanding of universality. But of course for a maxim to be unconditional it must be 
grounded in the act of willing itself. For the will to be unconditionally good it must not be determined by any other 
motive other than one of respect for the law. For the law restrains the will to posit an end that it itself is positing. 
4:400-403. Velleman nicely translates and explains on pages 344-349. 
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its object; and…an arresting awareness of that value (360).”46 To push the point further, when 
we encounter the other as a person we do not desire the person and his unique qualities but rather 
we stand in awe of her personhood.  
Velleman suggests love,  
…arrests our tendencies toward emotional self-protection from another person, 
tendencies to draw ourselves in and close ourselves off from being affected by him. Love 
disarms our emotional defenses; it makes us vulnerable to the other. 
 
 Akin to respect, love is a not an inclination towards a conditional end but rather it is an 
attitude towards the beloved, as an end-in-itself, that disarms our emotional defenses. The 
beloved, as an object, demands that they be loved in themselves. When we respect the person we 
come to ‘see’ the law/rational will in itself, and out of respect comes the arresting of our self-
love. When we love the beloved, we hold back our tendencies towards emotional self-protection 
from being affected by him/her. The attitude of love towards another person is one that is moral 
because it is recognizing something that is unconditional and worthy of our love. This, the 
process of disarming our emotional defenses, allows the lover to ‘see’ what is loved in and of 
itself without appealing to any other quality that might allow for the possibility of replaceability 
of the him/her.  
 To ‘see’ and appreciate someone’s dignity is something that accounts for why we love 
those who seem unlovable. For we often say, in a familial context, how much we love our 
                                                 
46 Velleman points to Kant’s GMM to better understand what respect means. In the footnote of 4:401 Kant 
says, “But though respect is a feeling, it is not one received by means of influence; it is, instead, a feeling self-
wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different from all feelings of the first kind, which 
can be reduced to inclination or fear. What I cognize immediately as a law for me I cognize with respect, which 
signifies merely consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without the mediation of other influences on 
my sense…Respect is properly the representation of a worth that infringes upon my self-love.” Key to our 
discussion is the last sentence, for love is a self-arresting of one’s emotional defenses and hence is a submission to 
the person qua person and not for any other reason. The person forces himself upon me when I am vulnerable to him 
as a person. 
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impatient grandmother or our nagging wife. Love gives us a reason for why we feel obligated to 
keep our promises made to loved ones. If we had no epistemic access to our cantankerous 
grandfather as a self-subsistent end, then why would we feel obligated to love him by taking care 
of him? It seems that Velleman is on to something here.  
 
II. Problems? When Appraising Persons are we ‘Seeing’ Persons as Irreplaceable? 
In response to Velleman, Linda Zagzebski tests whether or not Velleman accounts for the 
irreplaceability of all persons. She points out that if someone really is irreplaceable then it would 
follow that the dignity she has is an essential part of who she is. The loved one cannot lose that 
property in which she is not compared with anyone else, for if she could lose that incomparable 
property then she could be replaced by another person who instantiates the same property.47 
When we love our beloved ones, are we ‘seeing’ them as they really are – as irreplaceable – or 
are we ‘seeing’ them as irreplaceable because of their capacities to set ends for themselves? 
Velleman is correct in saying that the person is irreplaceable but I think his solution is not 
sufficient to account for such irreplaceability. For to be irreplaceable, according to Kant, is to 
have dignity, which means to not really be compared with anyone else. If irreplaceability is 
grounded in the sharable nature of rationality that everyone has, then it seems the thing that is 
supposed to explain why persons are irreplaceable is also shareable and hence replaceable.48  
                                                 
47 Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons." 415-416. 
 
48 If one were to look at Singer and his Practical Ethics, one can see why it is necessary to have both 
aspects of dignity. For if we just have the one aspect, infinite value, without the other, the irreplaceability aspect, 
then we can imagine a situation where an infant can be replaced by another infant. Peter Singer says, “At what stage 
in the process that passes from possible people to actual people does replaceability cease to apply? What 
characteristic makes the difference? If we think of living creatures – human or non-human – as self-conscious 
individuals, leading their own lives and wanting to go on living, the replaceability argument holds little appeal 
(125).” 
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Velleman’s account does, Zagzebski thinks, ground the infinite value of persons but not 
the irreplaceability of persons. Even Velleman himself admits that uniqueness cannot be part of 
the definition of personhood because it assumes that dignity has a price – qualitative uniqueness 
admits of a price.49 Linda Zagzebski suggests there is something deeper about the human person 
than the person’s rational will and personal, historical qualities. 
Even if we were to conclude that the rational capacities are necessary for dignity 
nonetheless we want to say they are not sufficient, for we can imagine a situation in which the 
capacities can be instantiated by another human person and hence the person being replaced by 
another person. This deeper property cannot be something that is sharable in nature. For the 
reasons given above, we need to account for the irreplaceable aspect of dignity by showing that 
the person is unique by virtue of not being compared to anyone else. What could this property 
be? Zagzebski suggests it is non-qualitative in the sense that it is incommunicable under the 
natural categories.50 For if we could describe the person as unique in his/her qualities, the person 
would cease to be unique. It seems Zagzebski is correct here, for if a person is reducible to 
his/her qualities, then the uniqueness of that particular person would be missing from analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Velleman says “Of course, some values do warrant substitutions among the objects that share them: 
that’s the definition of a price. To assume that something will be irreplaceable only if it is uniquely valuable is thus 
to assume that its value is a price rather than a dignity (368).” He later defines something that has unique value as 
being something that is qualitatively unique in value.  
 
50 Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons." 415. More on what incommunicable means will be discussed in 
the next chapter. For this incommunicable aspect of persons seems to be reasonable from what we have said 
uniqueness means in the context of love and friendship.  
46 
 
CHAPTER 3: 
KAROL WOJTYLA, GABRIEL MARCEL AND THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF PERSONS  
 
 
 
 
Given what we have said thus far about the dignity of persons, it seems that we need to 
account for not only the capacities that all persons share by virtue of being a human person but 
also the irreducible aspect of all persons. What would dignity be if it had no distinguishing 
feature to set it off against the properties that all persons share? Why does having such-and-such 
capacities prohibit one from treating the human person as a mere means to an end? It seems that 
Kant is right, that one needs to account for not only the infinite value of the person but also the 
irreplaceable aspect of the person to have a full explanation of what dignity is.51 For if dignity is   
grounded in the unique features of the person, then what gives those unique qualitative features 
their special status to prevent the person from becoming replaceable with another person who 
would instantiate the same properties?52 We need to account for something deeper about persons 
that can explain why all persons are irreplaceable.  
 
 
                                                 
51 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals., “In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price 
or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is raised 
above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity (4:434).” As seen in chapter one, Zagzebski 
interprets ‘raised above all price’ to mean ‘infinite value.’ Since it admits of no price it would not have a finite 
value. ‘That which admits of no equivalent’ means ‘irreplaceable’ since something that can be replaced is something 
that can be compared or shared. That which is ‘irreplaceable’ is something that cannot be shared or replaced.   
 
52 As I was thinking about this I could not but help think about the justification for foundationalism 
inasmuch as it pertains to the subject having foundational beliefs that cannot be reduced to other beliefs for their 
justification, for if such reduction is possible then an infinite regress of beliefs is possible. Thus beliefs must be 
grounded in something pre-theoretical – the belief must be non-inferential for it to stop the infinite regress. For 
example, the perception I am having seeing-a-tree is a perception and not a belief, for if it were a belief, it would 
have the property of being inferential. Analogously, we can say that dignity needs to stop at something irreducible to 
account for why we think persons are inviolable in nature. If dignity merely consists of one having the capacity to do 
x, then it seems that we could never get to the heart of what it means to be a person since a capacity is not a person, 
and vice-versa.  
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I. The Irreducibility of the Person  
Boethius, by defining personhood as one who is an individual substance of a rational 
nature, provides a good foundation for what it means to be a person, but the latter definition does 
not account for the irreducible nature of the person. Boethius’s definition gives us the following 
characteristics of the person: (1) the person is an individual substance: this means that the person 
is numerically distinct from any other person. It does not say anything though about the 
uniqueness of that person in its concrete form. (2) The person is a rational nature: the person not 
only is numerically distinct from other persons and things, but has something that is shared by all 
individual persons, namely rationality. To be rational is not merely to reason but to have the 
potential to exercise all capacities that contribute to the being determining and acting towards its 
natural end viz., fulfilling its end as a human person.53 The definition provides us with a good 
start since it individuates persons and also accounts for the general nature of what persons are 
qua human persons. What seems to be missing from Boethius’s definition is the irreducible 
aspect of persons which calls for a reassessment of the definition. The definition can, I will 
argue, be supplemented by what Karol Wojtyla calls ‘lived experience.’  
 
II. Karol Wojtyla on Subjectivity and the Irreducible 
Karol Wojtyla argues, in response to the reduction of persons to the world of natural 
objects, that the definition of persons is in need of something to account for the uniqueness of 
persons and this, he points out, is subjectivity. What he means by subjectivity is ‘experience lived 
                                                 
53 I am inferring that Boethius is using “rational nature” in the sense that Aristotle uses it.  
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through’ – that which is irreducible to the act of cognizing.54 If subjectivity or ‘lived experience’ 
were an object, then it could be defined explicitly and with precision. Wojtyla makes it clear that 
subjectivity is not the antithesis of the essential features that all persons possess, for example, 
those comprising “rationality” as Boethius conceives them, but rather, subjectivity builds upon 
those essential features that constitute persons.55  
What then does Wojtyla mean by subjectivity as ‘lived experience’? He thinks it has to 
do with the dynamic structure of the human person; that is, the dynamic structure of self-
possession and self-domination. The experience of the latter two features is experienced 
interiorly and forms the personal ‘I.’ The subject, in other words, is an ethical subject whose 
decisions made in response to conscience reveal the person, the ‘I’ who takes responsibility for 
such actions. The subject cannot be thought of as part of the process of self-determining action 
but gives rise to the action being a possible action – the subject/person is the condition for all 
moral actions to be executed.56The expression of such actions in concrete situations reveals the 
person as a subject; hence the subject can be epistemically accessed through his actions that stem 
                                                 
54 Karol Wojtyla, Person and Community : Selected Essays, Catholic Thought from Lublin (New York: P. 
Lang, 1993).110. “It is not only a question of metaphysical objectivization of man as the acting subject or the agent 
of his deeds, but the chief aim of this is to show the person as a subject living through his own deeds and 
experiences, and thanks to all this, his own subjectivity.” Subjectivity, according to Wojtyla, is not a capacity or 
object that can reduce the person to his or her qualities (as we have said earlier in the paper) but is the dynamic 
being of the person.  
 
55 Linda Zagzebski disagrees here, for she thinks that there is no solution in trying to tie the knot between 
the two aspects of dignity since something that is un-sharable in nature cannot be grounded in that which is 
shareable. Why? Because that which is shareable cannot be grounded in that which is un-shareable. But maybe there 
is a way out of this problem. This problem will be discussed at the end of the thesis paper. For now it suffices just to 
mention that there is not unanimous consent on the two aspects of dignity having any relation. See Uniqueness of 
Persons, 418-420. 
 
56 This sounds like Thomas Aquinas: “Of actions done by man those alone are properly called “human,” 
which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is the master of his actions. 
Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is the master. Now man is master of his 
actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as “the faculty and will of reason.” 
Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will.” St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros, 1947). I-I, q.1, 
a.1. 
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from an intentional person. Wojtyla says, “The “morale” [by “morale” he means the decisions 
arising through the person’s reason and will] is at the same time the fundamental expression of 
the transcendence proper to the personal ‘I’ (112).”  
Wojtyla argues that if we abstract the human person from the situation in which we find 
him, then we are reducing him to that which is shareable in nature. Given what we have said on 
why we are looking for something that is un-sharable, it seems only natural to fall back onto the 
pre-reflective level of knowing. Wojtyla suggests that the method we ought to use in our search 
for this irreducible aspect of persons is the phenomenological method by which we ‘see,’ viz., by 
“experience lived through.” The revelation of persons through their subjective experiences is a 
key aspect of persons in understanding why persons are irreplaceable.  
 
III. Gabriel Marcel and the Revelation of the Person in ‘Lived Experience’ 
To build upon Wojtyla’s notion of ‘lived experience’ as providing us with the foundation 
for the uniqueness of persons, I suggest that we look at Gabriel Marcel’s understanding of 
subjectivity. More specifically, I wish to explore Marcel’s understanding of the level of what he 
calls ‘submerged participation’ or being-in-a-situation.57 Up until this point, in our discussion of 
the dignity of persons, we have noticed that the definition of the person is not personal in nature. 
The person as defined thus far is not one in which I can say that particular person is in principle 
                                                 
57 Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being: Faith and Reality, Gateway Edition ed. (Henry Regnery, 1960). 
140. Marcel speaks about reflecting on the level of submerged participation. This is spoken of in the context of 
feeling as a mode of participation. By participation Marcel means something non-objective which persons involve 
themselves in without resorting to thought. Thought implies something shareable and hence something that is 
abstract; participation on the other hand reveals a level prior to thought. Feeling, Marcel argues, bears witness to 
such a level of existence. Marcel is on the right track. If feeling reveals, and is not thought of in terms of receiving 
data from the outside, then it can be said that feeling gives us epistemic access to such a level of existence. All I am 
pointing out when I refer to ‘submerged participation’ is a level of existence that is non-conceptual. Marcel also 
calls this level of existence being-in-a-situation.  
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irreplaceable. I can however say that that particular person is in fact irreplaceable. If we say, 
“Let us act in love towards that person as if he is irreplaceable,” then we are not satisfying the 
intuition that persons are in principle irreplaceable. This discussion of Marcel hopes to clarify 
who the ‘self’ is – the one who is asking the questions about dignity. Thus far we have been 
seeking necessary and sufficient conditions for the definition of personhood but failed to satisfy 
all of the conditions. The problem may lie in our starting point. Let us see how Marcel 
understands the person in order to clarify where we have gone wrong thus far. 58   
 
A. Methodology: The Starting Point of Analysis  
When we analyze a philosophical problem where do we start?59 Do we start with 
concepts right off the bat? Or do we start with what Marcel calls ‘embodied existence?’ What is 
the relation between the self and truth?60 If one takes the self to be something that is a ‘view 
from nowhere,’ then it seems that the relation between the self and truth is ‘clear and distinct.’ 
The latter is how Descartes viewed the self. Descartes argues that anything that is derived from 
                                                 
58 One should note that Marcel is unsystematic when developing these themes. A good example of Marcel’s 
way of doing philosophy is found in his introduction of the Mystery of Being: Part I on Reflection and Mystery. In 
delivering the Gifford Lectures in 1949-50 he said, “And, if pressed, I would expand that; I think the philosopher 
who first discovers certain truths and then sets out to expound them in their dialectical or systematic 
interconnections always runs the risk of profoundly altering the nature of the truths he has discovered (2).” 
 
59 In an article by Rodrick Chisholm, The Problem of the Criterion, he argues that either one is a 
‘methodist’ or a ‘particularist.’ In the case of being a methodist, one starts analysis by using a priori commitments. 
For example, if one is an empiricist one would start with the criterion, a wide net, to catch all of the particulars to 
which “the good” apples. But, Chisholm argues, how could this work since we have no knowledge of which apples 
are bad or which are good? We ought to rather start with a particularistic approach and find principles by looking at 
the particulars. This latter approach sounds similar to Aristotle’s approach to knowing. Marcel is doing something 
quite similar; he is a particularistic in the sense that he does not start with a criterion, but starts with what we do 
know: being – in-a-situation, from which we know that persons exist, have value, and are ends and not mere means 
to an end. The goal now is to flesh out what principles can be derived from concrete examples exemplifying love, 
fidelity and hope.  
 
60 The term self and soul are to be understood interchangeably. The soul just means the self – that which is 
the subject or the center of all human action/activity. The self/soul/subject is the cause of all human action. 
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the senses, when subject to scrutiny, must be analyzed into its constituent parts. Thus, when 
Descartes turns this analytic method onto himself, he ‘sees’ his mind and its capacities as the 
real self. Instead of starting with what we already know to be true, by virtue of participation, 
Descartes uses experience, submerged participation, as a springboard to arrive at what is really 
real. In other words, the clear and distinct ideas for Descartes are transparent to reality, 
providing the philosopher epistemic access to what is really the case about the world and its 
objects. But Marcel raises a good question, is this how we really do encounter the world? Is there 
a bifurcation between life and the intellect? What defines our ideas? The distinction between 
what is inside and outside is a good example of the split between the person (the Cartesian self) 
and the rest of the world.61  
The question is a methodological one in the sense that where we start our analysis will 
determine how we understand the self and its place in the world. For Marcel, the starting point 
will involve our fundamental situation in the world, which in turn will define our ideas of the 
dignity of persons. Any analysis or description of our ideas will necessarily involve a reference 
to the body and its being in a situation.62 
The question Marcel is trying to answer is one in which accounts for the body and subject 
being one and whole before analysis. In Marcel’s book, Mystery of Being, volume one (hereafter 
MBI GE, Gateway Edition) he says,  
body and soul…are treated as things, and things, for the purposes of logical discourse 
becomes terms, which one imagines as strictly defined, and as linked to each other by 
some determinable relation. I want to show that if we reflect on what is implied by the 
                                                 
61 Brendan Sweetman, The Vision of Gabriel Marcel: Epistemology, Human Person, the Transcendent  
(Rodopi Press, 2008). 10-13. 
 
62 By being-in-a-situation, Marcel means primordial experience, submerged participation, the experience 
we have before analysis of that experience. We will discuss this level of existence in more detail later on in this 
chapter. Not to get too deep into descriptions of what Descartes thought about the body, Marcel is going to critique 
Descartes in thinking that the body is a body and not my body.  
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datum of my body, by what I cannot help calling my body, this postulate, the body and 
soul are things, must be rejected; and this rejection entails the consequences of the first 
importance (115-116).63 
 
In other words, the situation in which I find myself when I think about my body is one 
that transcends analysis. The relation between the body and the soul is such that they can 
become terms for logical analysis, thereby making them easily interchangeable and replaceable. 
The question of course is, what is the level on which the body and the conscious subject are one 
and undivided? How do we get this datum of my body without abstracting from the situation we 
find ourselves in?64 
 
B. The Indubitable Datum: “There Is My Body” 
What, then, is a body in Marcel’s discussion of incarnate being? Before we answer that 
question I believe it would be best if we understand what he means by existence qua existence.  
He says, “This inquiry must be based on a certitude which is not rational or logical but 
existential; if existence is not at the beginning it is nowhere, for I do not believe that any 
transition can be made to existence which is not cheating or deception.”65   
Existence is the level from which his analysis of a body makes sense because it is prior in 
ontology to the level of abstraction. When the ‘I’ is looked at under the aspect of existence 
Marcel says, “I exist: that means I have something by which I can be known or identified, either 
by person or by myself insofar as I assume for myself a borrowed otherness; none of these 
                                                 
63 Added Italics for emphasis 
 
64 In The Vision of Gabriel Marcel, Sweetman develops the theme of Marcel’s the human being as being-
in-a-situation. The language of being-in-a-situation is not used by Marcel but is language Sweetman uses in order to 
describe what Marcel is doing when he talks about the relationship between the body and the conscious subject (24). 
 
65CF  Gabriel Marcel, Creative Fidelity, trans. Robert Rosthal (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2002). 18. 
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characteristics are separable from the fact that “there is my body.” The key here is that the datum, 
the-body-being-one’s-own-and-no one-else’s, belongs to me and not to anyone else and, as such, 
it cannot be fully understood disassociated from embodied being. This is the starting point – the 
embodied being provides a way to account for the body as being ‘my body’ and no one else’s.  
 
C. What Does It Mean to Say “My Body”? 
Marcel, in trying to account for the fundamental level of existence, argues that the 
analysis of the mind and body into subject and predicate as terms for logical analysis does not do 
full justice to our experiences and feelings of being one with ourselves. The reason is because of 
what we said earlier about Descartes’ understanding of the self. The self for Marcel is something 
that is non-transparent, whereas for Descartes the self is a clear and distinct idea. The self for 
Marcel is not an object at all; rather, the self is something that is felt and understood by just 
‘looking at things.’ If the starting point of the phenomenologist is correct, then the body, if it is 
to be thought of as my body, cannot be thought of as something external to the self. For 
Descartes, the self is thought of as a power that extended itself through the body, the body being 
a means to an end. Something curious, though, happens when we conceive of our body as an 
instrument to the self. When we try to conceive an external relation between the body and the 
self we find ourselves in an infinite regress of selves (MBI 113-116). The body therefore cannot 
be thought of as merely an instrument to the mind. For when we say ‘my body’ we see it as a 
possession and not something we merely use. The self and the body seem to have an intimate 
relationship, so intimate that to conceive of the body and self as two distinct things is doing 
injustice to the person as a human being.66 
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If the body is not really distinct from the mind, then what is the self? How then do we 
come to know the self as this non-transparent datum? For Marcel the body is not merely 
possessed but felt as his own. The ownership of the body is not like the ownership of one’s dog 
or car. This can be seen when Marcel says,  
I shall say once more that having, possessing, owning, in the strong and exact sense of 
the term, has to be thought of in analogy with that unity, a unity sui generis, which is 
constituted by my body in so far as it is my body (MBI GE 120). 
 
 This notion of ‘having’ implies something that can be lost or misplaced. It seems absurd 
to say that I can lose my body or misplace it. The ‘I,’ so conceived, is something distinct from 
the body and thus is already abstracted from the level of just ‘looking at things.’ Marcel, in 
analyzing how we speak about the body, argues that we are getting to the negative understanding 
of my body. The closer we progress in coming to understand what the subject is, the more aware 
we become that something is missing from the abstraction – this analysis prompts a desire for the 
wholeness of the human person. This desire is what Marcel calls ontological exigency.67 
 
The desire for wholeness is what is missing from abstract analysis of the self and the 
body. If, like Marcel, we were to conceive of a world in which the person were thought of in a 
functional sense, we could speak of the person as an object and not as a subject.68If the person is 
                                                 
66 Marcel would not be happy to use the word relationship since it implies two distinct things. Cf. MBI GE, 
118.  
67 Some translations render the word “exigency” as need. In Marcel’s book, The Philosophy of 
Existentialism, he writes, “Rather than beginning with abstract definitions and dialectical arguments which may be 
discouraging at the outset, I should like to start with a sort of global and intuitive characterization of man in whom 
the sense of the ontological – the sense of being – is lacking, or, to speak more correctly, of the man who has lost the 
awareness of this sense (9).”   
 
 68 Marcel by no means disagrees with Descartes that the distinction can logically be made, “In so far as I 
am a body: but not at all in so far as I am a consciousness. For, in a word, whatever the ultimate nature of 
consciousness may be, it obviously cannot be considered as a body, even a bodiless one. On this point, Descartes 
was right and with him all the forms of idealism that are derived from his thinking. Consciousness is essentially 
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thought of as one object among others, then it would seem that the human person is replaceable. 
This is the problem: The person cannot be seen as distinct from his/her body, in the natural sense 
of being a human person, because in doing so one is taking away the uniqueness of the person.  
 
D. Problem and Mystery  
 Before we speak about the relation between my body and myself qua subject, I think it 
would be apropos to flesh out the distinction between ‘problem’ and ‘mystery.’ For Marcel, the 
word ‘mystery’ refers to the level of reflection in which the questioner is intimately involved in 
the question being asked. In asking the question, the questioner finds himself reflecting upon a 
reflection. This act of reflecting upon reflection is what Marcel calls ‘secondary reflection.’ By 
the concept, ‘problem,’ Marcel is referring to the level of abstract of objects. This latter level 
situates the questioner as a disinterested spectator. In other words, the level of problematic 
reflection is a level of abstract thought which does not involve per se the questioner.69  
A ‘problem’ is something that is thrown in front of the person, thrown in such a way that 
it causes the person to reflect upon it as an object. If a ‘problem’ is something that is involves the 
person’s attention, then it also implies a solution. The problem, therefore, is something that can 
be publically discussed, understood and solved. 70 
To understand the notion of the problem, let us find a concrete example. A couple of days 
ago, when I was driving my car to work, I noticed the ‘maintenance needed’ light was illumined 
                                                 
something that is the contrary of a body, of a thing, of whatever thing one likes to imagine, and given that fact it is 
permissible to think that the expression ‘state of consciousness’ involves a contradiction in terms (MB 50).”  
Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, trans. G. S. Fraser (Harvill Press).  
69 The Mystery of Being: Faith and Reality. 102-103; The Philosophy of Existentialism  (Citadel Press, 
2002).,18-19. 
 
70 Sweetman, The Vision of Gabriel Marcel: Epistemology, Human Person, the Transcendent.56. 
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on the dashboard. Thinking nothing of the orange light indicator, I continued to drive to work. A 
few minutes later, my car’s engine suddenly came to a complete stop on the road. In a panic I 
pulled the car over to the road’s shoulder and got out of the car waving my hands for someone to 
stop and help. This situation, of my car’s engine breaking down, required my full attention, 
causing me to step back from the submerged level of existence into analysis.  
The problem was something that stepped in front of me, requiring me to pay attention to 
it.71What Marcel calls reflection is the activity of directing one’s attention to the break in the 
chain of habit (MBI GE 96). In the act of reflection I am focusing on a problem that needs to be 
solved. In the case of my car breaking down, I was surprised and taken back when my car broke 
down because I was not anticipating it to breakdown anytime soon.  
 Notice something here. ‘Problems’ are something that requires reflection and hence it 
involves a public language and communication to get the problem solved. I go to the mechanic 
shop and find myself needing a part that the mechanic and all mechanics understand to be the 
correct part. The fact that my mechanic can ask his friend next door for a part he is looking for 
requires his neighbor to have the same concept that he has. But notice that my way of being, 
living, the ‘lived experience,’ was interrupted by my car breaking down. Distinctions began to 
arise in my mind as soon as my car broke down; I did not feel with myself one with the car but 
rather I saw my car as a project to be solved. When one reflects upon a problem, the problem 
becomes for him an object which is shareable in nature. This is what Marcel calls primary 
reflection. 
                                                 
71 Marcel uses an example of putting his hand in his pocket to find that his watch is not there when it 
usually is there. The shock felt of the pocket watch not being there breaks the habit and requires reflection. This 
activity of reflection is essentially attention directed towards a break in the chain of habit. Marcel, The Mystery of 
Being: Faith and Reality. 95-96. 
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 Problems, as we saw above, are things that require our attention and problem solving 
skills. The mechanic, who fixed my car, could have been replaced by another mechanic; as long 
as the other mechanic was a good mechanic, then it would follow that my car would get fixed. 
My car did not have to get fixed by any particular mechanic in order for it to be fixed. If we 
were to think about this and reflect on the dignity of that person, something would be missing. 
This mechanic is not just any mechanic; he is a person who happens to be a mechanic. What 
Marcel calls “mystery” is that realm in which the mechanic is a particular person. The realm of 
the mysterious is not to be understood as something being unintelligible; rather, it is a level 
which primary reflection cannot account for by means of reason alone. The level of mystery is 
one in which fills in the gap between the abstract and the particular. 
 
E.  ‘My Body’ as Mystery 
In developing Marcel’s understanding of the starting point of inquiry, we need to 
understand what he means by ‘my body’ as a mystery. For Descartes, the self initiates the 
inquiry, not with experience or being-in-a-situation, but rather on the level of abstract reflection. 
The act of primary reflection, Marcel argues, is not the end of inquiry wherein we seek after the 
full explanation of reality. As has been pointed out, the description of the body as an instrument 
fails to follow with our intuitions about our body being intimately our own in the felt sense and 
not the ownership sense. What, then, is this felt sense of the body and subject? What would be 
the relationship of the body and subject on the level of pre-reflective experience?  Given the 
insufficient picture of the body as external in relation to the subject, what then does the relation 
look like on the level of mystery? In response to the latter Marcel says,   
This philosophy [Incarnate Being/My Body] is based on a datum which is not 
transparent to reflection [primary reflection], and which, when reflected, implies an 
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awareness not of contradiction but of a fundamental mystery, becoming an antimony as 
soon as discursive thought tries to reduce or problematize it.72 
 
That is, mystery is opaque when the questioner is intimately involved in the questioning 
or reflecting because “a mystery is a problem which encroaches upon its own data, invading 
them, as it were, and thereby transcending itself as a simple problem.”73 If I were to inquire as to 
whether I have a body, it would be absurd to even ask the question because it is ‘you’ asking the 
question and not someone else!  
Other examples of mysteries for Marcel would be: Love, Fidelity, Hope and Freedom. To 
understand love and fidelity, the person must act on the promise as if it were unconditional; 
otherwise, promise-making does not make any rational sense. In Being and Having, Marcel 
makes this point about the realm of mystery and how it relates to the embodied context: “A 
mystery is something in which I am myself involved, and it can therefore only be thought of as a 
sphere where the distinction between subject and object, between what is in me and what is 
before me, loses its meaning and its initial validity.” What is important here is the ontological 
irreducibility of the embodied self, as it situates the person in a context where meaning is found 
for the person. “Meaning for the person” does not imply a pure relativity in meaning, but rather is 
the reference point for the reflective act of secondary reflection to recover the experience of the 
being-in-the-situation.  
 
 
                                                 
72 Gabriel Marcel's Perspectives on the Broken World, trans. Katharine Rose Hanley, Marquette Studies in 
Philosophy (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1998). 23. 
 
73 The Philosophy of Existentialism. 19. 
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F.  Second-Degree Reflection as a Realist Way Out 
 How is this indubitable datum of incarnate being found by virtue of reasoning? Is Marcel 
in a solipsistic circle of questioning and reasoning? If Marcel is a realist with respect to reality, 
how does he ‘access’ being if he is a being, himself? For Marcel, reflection is not only 
abstracting from the existential situation, of primary reflection, but also that of secondary 
reflection. Marcel explains “secondary reflection” as  
[t]he recognition of mystery.… [Secondary reflection] is an essentially positive act of the 
mind, the supremely positive act in virtue of which all positivity may perhaps be strictly 
defined. In this sphere everything seems to go on as if I found myself acting on an 
intuition which I possess without immediately knowing myself to possess it – an intuition 
which cannot be, strictly speaking, self-conscious and which it can grasp itself only 
through the modes of experience in which its image is reflected, and which it lights up by 
being thus reflected in them…by means of this [reflection upon reflection], thought 
stretches out toward the recovery of an intuition which otherwise loses itself in 
proportion as it is exercised.74 
 
It seems from the above passage that Marcel is using intuition not as a concept but rather 
as something non-conceptual, a way of the questioner recognizing being in its mystery. Thomas 
Michaud in his discussion on ‘secondary reflection’ takes Marcel to be saying that it is a 
reflection that is guided and illumined by intuition but is silent when it comes to speaking in 
terms of concepts. The key here for Michaud is the close kinship between the problem/mystery 
distinction with that of primary/secondary reflection since it reveals the goal that Marcel is 
essentially after; that is, the goal of recovering experience as it is experienced by the person.75  
The essence of what Marcel desires to show is that, via primary reflection, experience is 
not something one can grasp in its entirety, nor is one’s body my body via primary reflection. The 
                                                 
74 Being and Having, trans. Katharine Farrer (London: Dacre Press, 1949). 118. 
 
75Thomas A Michaud, "Secondary Reflection and Marcelian Anthropology," Philosophy Today 34, no. 3 
(1990). 223. 
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work of intuition, the guide in restoring the person who has been bifurcated by the 
body/consciousness distinction or identification, is to see the person as experienced or felt in 
her/his existential embodied state. The nature of what an intuition is cannot be revealed 
conceptually, but only non-conceptually. To illuminate the discussion, let us refer to an 
experience with which I myself am intimately involved. Taking my body to be distinct from my 
consciousness, I could say that there seems to be a disconnect from the reality I perceive in my 
everyday experience. My body seems to exist at one and the same (paradoxically so) along with 
my consciousness. In other words, the abstraction process does not account for the whole of 
myself as body and consciousness – these are not, as Descartes would say, two distinct 
substances; rather, they are to be seen as a holistic communion between two aspects of myself. 
The body, if conceived as a body, cannot be my body since it is disconnected from who I am. The 
assertion, “I am my body,” is not a materialistic assertion but an existential one.  
The act of second-degree reflection is a sort of indeterministic understanding of what it 
means for my soul and body to be one. A good example of the latter is the Holy Union of a 
husband and a wife in marriage where the husband is one and the same with his wife, and contra. 
The fact that the two married persons are of one flesh cannot be fully accounted for via primary 
reflection. Hence, secondary reflection supplements the explanation of fidelity of the married 
couple by referring to the concrete experiences of their commitment to each other. For marriage 
is usually understood to be a commitment to the other even when the other does not reciprocate. 
In the mode of primary reflection one could analyze the relationship as being conditional, and 
give justification for one spouse to give up on the other without contradiction. But we all know 
that marriage would not be marriage if the commitment were conditional. I chose to love my 
wife even if she does not reciprocate my love. The love is for the other as a person and not as an 
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object. Thus, love for the other can be unconditional. Secondary reflection pieces back the 
abstract notion of reciprocity with the person who is a mystery. Marriage would not make sense 
if it were only to be analyzed in the reductive sense.  
 
 How then does this act of secondary reflection give us knowledge with respect to the 
unitive aspect of the union between the body and the soul/mind? According to Michaud,  
Marcel’s response might be that secondary reflection’s expressions merely index a 
disclosure of metaphysical truth. The expressions are heuristic guides which can lead to a 
lived existential assurance of their truth.… Metaphysical truth finds its fullest and most 
satisfying philosophical adequacy as that which leads on and is disclosed through 
concordant lived-assurances with intersubjectively shared expressions...76 
  
In other words, Marcel is not dismissing truth as something objective in itself; rather, he 
is dismissing an approach to the truth that regards it only as object. The latter is misguided since 
truth is not grasped in one essential definition.  
The orientation towards truth deals with how the person is situated, rather than with 
propositional truth that reason can determine or put boundaries upon; Marcel would not deny that 
we can have propositional truth, but would argue that truth in its fullness is found in Being with 
which the questioner is intimately involved. The latter is a mystery because the intellect cannot 
fully grasp the objective relation since it is itself enmeshed in that relation.  
 Truth for Marcel is not entirely propositional and abstract but rather is also found by 
virtue of intuition. The process of secondary reflection thereby brings together, or unifies, that 
which was lost in the process of abstraction and tries to clarify, in light of the embodied being, 
what it means to be a body that is mine. It seems that Truth, like Being, is that which the 
                                                 
76 Ibid. pp.227 
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individual strives after, viz., a unity of that which has been analyzed into its constituent parts.77 
In other words, truth is not just a correspondence between a proposition and how the world really 
is; rather, it is that plus other forms of evidence that are available only through intuition and 
mystery by virtue of reference to the primitive situation from which, alone, one is able recognize 
the evidence in whatever form it may take.78 
 
G. Why is the Embodied Situation the Primary Mode of Being? 
  
Why is Marcel so keen on putting the body back into its primitive situation of existence 
rather than in its abstracted mode of being? For Marcel, the body, as found in the embodied 
situation, is primary because it avoids the problem of solipsism, for which reality is the 
abstracted self and nothing more. For the self to get outside itself, it must be presupposed that the 
self is already in contact with the world and its relations with other persons. For Marcel, the body 
as embodiment plays a big role in getting outside oneself and located in one’s existential 
situation. The latter became a novel idea in French Philosophy, for until Marcel, philosophy dealt 
with an egocentric reality that provided no good framework or philosophy to account for the 
Other. 79 
                                                 
77Interestingly enough Kenneth Gallagher in his book on The Philosophy of Knowledge says, in regard to 
truth, that there exists evidence for which the neutral observer cannot account since, as subject, or embodied being, 
he is intimately involved with it: “The knower of mystery is not a spectator but a participator: some evidence is only 
available to the participant and not to the neutral observer…The participation is the foundation for my subjectivity; 
my knowledge is posterior to participation…participation is the ground for evidence (242).” Kenneth T. Gallagher, 
The Philosophy of Knowledge  (New York,: Sheed & Ward, 1964). 
 
78Seymour Cain, Gabriel Marcel's Theory of Religious Experience, American University Studies Series 
Vii, Theology and Religion (New York: P. Lang, 1995). “There can be no truth about what transcends space/time, 
what does not exist for immediate consciousness, but there can only be truth, which is beyond existence, just as 
freedom is the condition of verification, though itself unverifiable (25).”  
 
79 Erwin W. Straus and Michael A. Machado, "Gabriel Marcel's Notion of Incarnate Being," in The 
Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel: The Library of Living Philosophers, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn 
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The body, as a participant, provides a way for accounting for community and other 
minds. Marcel makes clear in Creative Fidelity that sensation should not to be seen as a faculty 
receptive of data, for if such a conception is accepted then one is already presupposing an 
external world of which one is not a part.80 Sensation for Marcel is not a passive receiving but 
rather communication or sensation itself; that is, sensation/feeling is immediate and is essentially 
manifesting itself in the world of which, by virtue of participation, it is intimately a 
part.81Sensation, feeling, and body are all on the basic level of embodiment which constitutes the 
person and his/her communion with the external world. This makes it possible for one to know 
other minds and to have sympathy for another state of being than our own. This basic level does 
not account for the I-Thou relation but nevertheless plays a key role in making possible for the I-
Thou relation in which only persons can participate by virtue of their being free. 
 In the above analysis, one can quickly see that there does seem to be something odd 
about this non-objective relationship between the body and the world. Marcel would probably 
respond by saying that the existential situation is pre-cognitive and, as such, one needs to resort 
to the realm of mystery by using the method of secondary reflection to account for the above 
intuition. Another way to put it is this: in order for one even to have a concept of what a body is 
one needs to ‘step back’ from the existential situation of which is one intimately a part and then 
think about “a body” in its universalized form. Once one has ‘stepped back,’ as it were, then the 
                                                 
(La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Pub. Co., 1984).“The centrality of the body in Marcel’s thought makes possible an even 
more broad-based conception of human reality. The process of embodiment works downward as well as upward: it 
feeds the hidden roots of our active community with beings, it nourishes our transcendental relation with being. 
Human embodiment connects us to both physical and metaphysical reality (136).” 
 
80 Marcel, Creative Fidelity. 24-25. 
 
81 Due to the constraints of this chapter I chose not to focus on sensation per se but I do want to make clear 
that it is vitally important on the basic level of embodiment since sensation, feeling, and body all together constitute 
that level as such.  
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person can rationally analyze what body we talking about and what it means to say my body as 
opposed to someone else’s! This last step is reflection upon reflection, secondary reflection 
whereby the person ‘sees’ or is illumined about the situation from which he/she derived the 
concept of ‘a body.’  
The above reflection, in turn, is not a proof  which all reasonable people are obligated to 
assent to, but rather, is based on an intuition of what it means to say ‘my body’ as opposed to ‘a 
body.’ This last point can be substantiated by phenomenological descriptions of what it means to 
exist in ‘my body.’ To take a concrete example of what Marcel means, let us look more closely 
at the previous example of my car breaking down. Soon after my car broke down I was able to 
get hold of a mechanic who had the knowledge of how to fix my car’s engine. This mechanic I 
called was a dear friend of mine whom I trusted, and with whom I had a shared history. This 
mechanic’s name was John. Now is it possible that another mechanic could rebuild my engine in 
the same way John could? Sure it is possible, for any mechanic who has the concept of 
rebuilding engines could fix my car. But would we say that John is replaceable by anyone? It 
does not seem so.  If John, as a particular subject, were not taken into consideration, then I would 
not, by Marcel’s standards, understand John as a subject who is more than just ‘a body’ that 
could be substituted by any other person’s. The latter example shows why the embodied level of 
existence is primary, for with the particular subject, John, and the concept, ‘mechanic,’ we can 
understand what it means to be a ‘someone’ as opposed to an ‘object.’  
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IV. Is Marcel’s Embodied-Situational-Existence Sufficient to give us the Second 
Source of Dignity?  
  The distinction can now be made between a ‘someone’ and a ‘something.’ The subject 
can be understood on the level of being-in-a-situation. This level of existence is one that cannot 
be conceptualized and hence cannot be shared in nature. Though the concept cannot be shared, 
the intuition given by the act of secondary reflection can illumine the insufficiency of mere 
conceptual analysis. By conceptual analysis we can only get to the capacities of the person and 
not the person him/herself! The reason why we need to account for the person is because 
personhood is what needs to be defined.  
 
The person as defined by Kant can now be accounted for in its two aspects: 
irreplaceability and infinite value. The person is irreplaceable because he/she is irreducible to 
conceptual analysis, thereby making him/her a thou rather than an it. We can now say by means 
of Marcel’s existential analysis that persons are in principle irreplaceable and not merely so in 
fact. Given Marcel’s analysis of my body we can say that the person is not whole in being if 
analyzed into his/her constituent parts. This does not mean that we ought not to do conceptual 
analysis by means of reflection – no; what we can say is that mere conceptual analysis is not 
sufficient to account for the person in his wholeness. In other words, we do not end our inquiry at 
persons having x,y, and z capacities. Rather, as we have seen throughout this thesis paper, 
capacities do not suffice for a full explanation of the dignity of the person. The ‘who’ was not 
distinguished properly from the ‘what.’ 
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A. The Irreplaceability of Persons in light of Marcel’s Understanding of 
Subjectivity  
Up to now we have explored several accounts of persons and their value. Boethius’s 
definition of persons we found was insufficient since it failed to give us persons as distinct from 
their nature. The person was reduced to a natural object of inquiry for the knower. Given that 
natural objects admit of a price, we cannot say that persons have dignity. Locke’s account 
showed how there is a personal component to the definition of dignity but failed to show that 
persons are more than their self-consciousness or reflection. Kant’s analysis of persons found 
that they are only as valuable by virtue of their capacity to set ends for themselves. Up to this 
point the problem was our starting point of analysis. This starting point was insufficient to give 
us a definition of dignity that would account for our experiences of friendship and love. Given 
the above analysis of Marcel’s understanding of subjectivity, we can now say that persons are 
irreplaceable because of their being embodied. His analysis of the body and mind showed that 
persons are not naturally thought of as being two distinct things. This non-conceptual level of 
existence gives us the reason why the notion of irreplaceability of persons is not merely a 
sentimental attitude. We can now explain our experiences with a certainty of feeling and 
intuition. Of course we can never prove such premise but we can show it by appealing to 
concrete experiences. Marcel would say that such proving is a misunderstanding of the nature of 
things. Persons cannot be analyzed into a problem without serious harm to how we understand 
the love between ourselves and our loved ones. As we have seen above, analysis of persons that 
results in their being replaceable fails to give us the correct understanding of our experiences. 
Apart from analysis, when, habitually, I walk down the road on which I live, I can distinguish 
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between a human person and a brick building. The person is a mystery in the sense that she/he 
cannot be reduced to the level of an object.  
 If our philosophy does not take into consideration the rich, concrete experiences that 
cannot be fully conceptualized, then what do we have left to work with? Our concepts are 
derived from this primordial experience – why, then, do we not inquire into that level of 
existence? It would only seem human to take into consideration all of the data. Given that we 
make friends with persons as ends in themselves, would it not follow that the friend is really a 
person as found in our concrete experiences? Our concrete experiences ought to give us guidance 
as to where we are wrong in our analysis. If we cannot account for the love and fidelity that we 
experience between ourselves and our loved ones as subjects, then I am not sure what philosophy 
is good for. Even those who are not religious can recognize the concrete experiences of love and 
fidelity that exist between two irreducible subjects. How then can one say that dignity is an 
empty concept? To understand the dignity of the person is to understand that persons are not 
reducible to conceptual analysis.  
 
B. Critique of the Person as Being Irreplaceable in ‘Lived Experience’ 
One could respond to Marcel and ask, what exactly does it mean for the subject to be 
found in the embodied context of being? Are we not conceptualizing this level of existence on 
which the subject is found? Are we not using concepts in describing the level of being-in-a-
situation (‘lived experience’)? Are we not using concepts in describing our concrete examples of 
love and friendship? Marcel would probably respond by saying that you do not understand the 
process by which we get concepts. The concepts of love, dignity, and fidelity are not concepts 
that can be fully explained by abstract thought. The recuperative act of secondary reflection, 
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intuition, looks back upon where the concepts were derived and asks, “What is that?” The mode 
of being, in other words, does not start with concepts but rather something else. This something 
else can be best explained in terms that are negative, but nevertheless is real by virtue of our 
feelings and sensation. The feelings do not generate concepts but they do provide us with some 
sort of grounding of experience as something indeterminate. To argue in conceptual terms is to 
fail to realize what Marcel is actually doing when he says that subjectivity or experience cannot 
be determined.  
Thus the irreplaceability of persons can only be understood by reflecting back upon 
subjectivity itself and trying to put the pieces together by means of feelings and concrete 
examples. The concrete examples serve to piece the intuitions together with the concepts. For 
example, to understand the dignity of the human person we look at the concept of the capacities 
that all persons possess along with the intuition that persons are in principle irreplaceable. This 
intuition is not arrived at haphazardly; rather, it is arrived at by virtue of who we are as 
questioners. We as questioners are the ones asking the question about ourselves and, as such, it 
will involve something unique and un-shareable in nature. The question of uniqueness of persons 
can only be asked by we who are persons. Our uniqueness is found in the fact that our 
experiences and subjectivity cannot be shared by any other person. If it were shareable, it would 
not be me, my body and my being a subject. 
This critique, though a good one, fails to understand the different ways of understanding 
a person. One can understand a person to be a thing by primary analysis, but this fails to account 
for the definition of a person. A person is not another object in the world. If he/she were, then 
why do we emphasize human rights issues in our culture? Why is it that we are appalled and 
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disgusted when we see Coptic Christian heads severed on the Mediterranean beach by ISIS?82 
Why is it that we feel outraged when we see parents neglect their autistic daughter by caging her 
in their basement?83  These emotive responses are not unwarranted since our response is to these 
persons’ dignity (their infinite value and irreplaceability) being violated. Why would we get 
upset about someone’s head being cut off if that human person were not one of us (referring to 
the example of the Coptic Christians being executed)? To say that those violations of dignity are 
nothing more than violations of civil law is ludicrous. If we were to reject the irreplaceable 
aspect of persons in our definition of dignity, how could we account for the sorrow we feel over 
the death of the Coptic Christians who live in a different country?  It would not make sense if we 
were to say that it is because they have rationality and can consciously set goals for the future. 
The latter reasons do not carry the ontological weight we are looking for. Again, Marcel is 
pointing out the emptiness of a functionalized world, that is, a world without the recognition of 
all persons having dignity. In such a world we have definitions of persons that leave out the 
subjectivity of the person, leaving us with nothing but a conditionally valued object.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 CNN Staff, "Isis Video Appears to Show Beheadings of Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya,"  
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/15/middleeast/isis-video-beheadings-christians/. 
 
83 Meghan Dwyer, "Charged: Brookfield Couple Accused of Locking Teenage Daughter in Basement, 
Forcing Her to Wear Diaper," Fox6 News, http://fox6now.com/2015/03/25/charged-brookfield-couple-accused-of-
locking-teenage-daughter-in-basement-forcing-her-to-wear-a-diaper/. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE TYING OF THE KNOT: HOW ARE WE TO COHERENTLY UNDERSTAND THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SOURCES OF DIGNITY? 
 
 
Given that we have argued up to this point in the thesis for two sources of dignity, infinite 
value and irreplaceability, what is the ontological/logical glue that holds them together? Linda 
Zagzebski argues that insofar as one of them is shareable and the other is not, they cannot be put 
together into a coherent whole. For how can something shareable, viz., the person’s capacities, 
be grounded in something un-shareable in nature? The property of being-a-rational-being cannot 
ground the property of being incommunicable in one’s subjectivity.84 In other words, the two 
sources of dignity are incompatible with each other and cannot both be found in the same thing, 
such as an individual substance.85 If I understand Zagzebski correctly, she argues that the two 
aspects of dignity are to be understood separately without being essentially united to one thing 
since a thing can have one property without having the other. But what if we were to argue that 
the thing is a human person and cannot, by virtue of being a human being, be understood apart 
from either aspect of dignity? In this chapter I will argue that the two sources of dignity 
discussed thus far cannot be seen apart from the same subject. For if our concept of the human 
person is an individual subject who is a person, as we have argued throughout this paper, then it 
would follow that one cannot recognize that subject without the subject having both infinite and 
irreplaceable value.  
                                                 
84 Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons." 418. In a footnote she says, “My position here is that it is 
possible for the same thing to have both aspects of dignity, but not in virtue of the same thing. Human persons have 
qualities in addition to possessing subjectivity. Some/one of the former grounds their infinite value; the latter 
grounds their irreplaceable value.” 
 
85 Ibid. 420. “Kant is right that it takes both infinite and irreplaceable value to explain the value of persons, 
but he is wrong in thinking that one aspect of dignity entails the other. They are in fact incompatible kinds of value; 
hence they cannot attach (directly) to the same object.” 
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Taking Boethius’s definition of personhood, we can say personhood is derived from nature, 
which distinguishes the human being from other natural things, while subjectivity is what makes 
action, existence and experience possible. When a human person acts in the Thomistic sense, 
actus humanus, it follows that the person is revealed in experience. The action is human in the 
sense that it is derived from an intentional or deliberate act. We can, with Marcel, say that 
subjectivity is indeterminate or the grounds for reflection. Nevertheless on the level of existence 
we can say that actions are revealed to us, such as acts of love and fidelity, which reveal the 
subjectivity of the person who is the author of those acts. We would not say that the two aspects 
of dignity are incompatible since they are unified in the subject’s actions. The experience of the 
act in freedom and the uniqueness of the act grant us the two aspects under the same subject.86 
 
H. Problems with thinking of the two aspects of dignity as two distinct 
properties 
 
In a paper given by Paul Kurcharski to the first U.S. conference of the Pontifical Academy of 
St. Thomas Aquinas, he argues that Zagzebski is mistaken in thinking of the two aspects as two 
properties.87  Kurcharski positively argues that the correct way of thinking about the two aspects 
of the person is in terms of an individual substance of a rational nature. Though Zagzebski does 
                                                 
86Thomas Aquinas defines human action as follows: “[O]f actions done by man those alone are properly 
called “human,” which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is the 
master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is the master. Now 
man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as “the faculty and will 
of reason.” Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will.”  Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica. I-I, q.1, a.1.  
 
87 Paul Kurcharski, "What Does It Mean to Be “Incommunicable” and Why Does It Matter?," in Thomas 
Aquinas: Teacher of Humanity: The First U.S. Conference of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas 
(Houston, Texas2013). 
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admit of building upon the definition of person given by Boethius, nevertheless it seems from her 
discussion that she sees the person as a mix of properties without anything unifying those 
properties.88 The reason why Zagzebski thinks the two aspects are two properties of the human 
person is that she thinks that one can have one without having the other. For example, Aristotle’s 
unmoved mover might instantiate rationality but not subjectivity. Or there might be a uniquely 
incommunicable ugly spider that is irreplaceable but nevertheless does not instantiate rationality. 
These examples only work if one does not take into account human nature and its essence. 
Instead of talking about instances of rational nature, Kurcharski suggests that we look at Aquinas 
and his account of human nature. In response to Zagzebski, Kurcharski suggests that,  
A person is not a collection of properties, but rather a unified and concrete substance 
whose nature and properties can be isolated and considered in abstraction, however this 
nature and these properties should not be treated as concrete things themselves, which I 
take Zagzebski to be doing (implicitly, if not explicitly). A person’s incommunicability 
finds its ultimate metaphysical explanation in his or her human nature, but simply 
because human persons share a nature in common does not mean that what flows from 
this nature cannot be radically unique (8).89  
 
 In other words, what Kurcharski is pointing out is this: the two properties, the two 
sources of dignity, are not incompatible properties if they are grounded in the human person. It 
does not follow that from human nature must flow only shareable properties. The question is not 
who exhibits properties x and y, but rather, who is that particular human person? In other words, 
even if certain properties are not instantiated by the human being it does not take away from the 
‘who.’ If we were to see the two sources of dignity as two properties in themselves, then how 
could we respond to Peter Singer and his criticisms? Singer would ask, “What makes a human 
being special without the property of being-irreplaceable?” It would not suffice to say that the 
                                                 
88 Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons." 420, as mentioned in the previous page.  
 
89 Kurcharski, "What Does It Mean to Be “Incommunicable” and Why Does It Matter?." 
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human person is special, has dignity, if she/he instantiates such a property. If we are correct 
about the second source of dignity being essential to being human, then it would follow that all 
human persons are incommunicably their own, implying that they are irreplaceable. But if those 
properties are not unified in an individual substance, then we fail to realize the 
incommunicability of someone who does not exhibit rational properties. Singer asks a good 
question, that is, what makes human beings so special? It is not sufficient to say with Boethius 
that persons are individual substances of a rational nature. For rationality is not sufficient to 
ground the irreplaceability of persons. Though it might set apart human beings, it nevertheless 
does not account for the uniqueness of persons. The problem here is not what particular human 
being is a person, but rather, how are we to understand such a connection between the human 
nature/personhood and the irreplaceable aspect of dignity.  
 
III. Gabriel Marcel and Substance 
If Kurcharski is correct, how then are we to understand the notion of substance? Can 
something unique and shareable live in the same ontological house? Is substance the glue and the 
base that can account for the grounding of the two aspects of dignity? To flesh out Kurcharski’s 
suggestion in more detail, I propose to look at Marcel’s and Karol Wojtyla’s philosophical 
framework. By doing so, we will better grasp the grounding for the two aspects of dignity in the 
human being him/herself.  
As seen the previous chapter, Marcel critiques Descartes’ understanding of the ego as 
substance. Though he critiqued Descartes on his abstract concept of the person nevertheless 
Marcel seems to want to say there is something that grounds ontology of being. Marcel scholar, 
Thomas Michaud, suggests that,  
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For Marcel, being is not some disconnected, completely self-standing substance but involves 
all existents, and thus its relatedness is intrinsic to its nature. Being cannot be duly 
appreciated without including its relations, and similarly, human being cannot be properly 
appreciated without including its relatedness, especially to others.90 
 
Being, in other words, is the ground for relations with others. Being human is essentially 
being related with others, that is, inter-subjectivity. Though Marcel seems to think there are no 
self-standing substances, he is responding to Descartes and his view of the ego as a substance. 
Remember that for Marcel, the body connects us with the world and the relations within. The 
body, for Descartes, was something that was not known with clear and distinct perception and 
therefore was not the starting point of inquiry. For Marcel, on the contrary, the body is what 
grounds our subjectivity, ‘lived experience.’ The body is my body and as such it is not a 
substance that can be shared by another. This, then, does not rule out substance per se but rather 
it rules out the Cartesian understanding of substance. For how else can we talk about this person 
as opposed to another person? The uniqueness can be found in the individual substance, but that 
substance must be understood to be the whole person, not just his/her ego. The uniqueness, as 
Wojtyla will argue, is found in self-knowledge of being unique. Self-knowledge is the activity of 
reflexivity, that is, being aware of oneself as a subject and not an object. Similar to Marcel, but 
instead of leaving us on the level of phenomenological descriptions, Wojtyla wants to argue that 
when we are aware of our efficacy, then it follows that we are more than just our actions. For any 
activity we undergo, whether it is intellectual or consciousness, we are still more than our 
activities. Who does these activities is this human being and not another.  
What the discussion on Marcel accomplished, in chapter three, was to point out the universal 
intuition of human persons being unique and irreplaceable. Given that we have a glimpse into 
                                                 
90 Thomas  Michaud, "Introduction: Gabriel Marcel and the Postmodern World," Bulletin de la Société 
Américaine de Philosophie de Langue Française 7, no. 1/2 (1995). 14-15. 
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what it looks like via concrete situations of ‘lived experience,’ how now do we put the two 
aspects together? That is, how do we unify the phenomenological descriptions of the person as 
unique with the metaphysical discussion of persons as infinitely valuable?  My suggestion will 
be to look at Karol Wojtyla’s Thomistic metaphysics.  
 
IV. Karol Wojtyla and the Relation between Human Nature and the Person 
Taking a Thomistic view of the human person, Wojtyla explains, in his article Subjectivity 
and the Irreducible in Man, that the person as defined in the classical Aristotelian sense does not 
consider man in his subjectivity. When we do not consider man in his subjectivity, then it 
follows that we reduce man to the natural order. The question we want to answer is what, then, is 
the relation between man as a subject and man as an object? We do not want to say that man is 
merely a subject, for then it leads to the conclusion that there is nothing communicable about 
man considered as an object, i.e., as possessing attributes that constitute a nature. On the other 
hand, if we say that man is only an object then it would follow that he is in fact not unique and is 
reduced to another thing in the natural order. Is there no answer to this problem as Zagzebski 
pointed out above? Karol Wojtyla finds the answer to lie in the scholastic approach to 
consciousness, that is, in rationality in the broadest sense of the word.  
 
A. Consciousness qua Rationality as Understood by Karol Wojtyla 
In the Scholastic approach, the aspect of consciousness was on the one hand only 
implied and, as it were, hidden in “rationality” (this refers to the definitions, homo est 
animal rationale and persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia); on the 
other hand it was contained in the will (understood as appetites rationalis) and 
expressed by voluntaries (30).91  
                                                 
91 Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, trans. A. Potocki (Dordrecht/Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 
1979). 
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 Wojtyla explains that our experiences are formed because of consciousness and that 
without this aspect of the person we have no experience. There are many manifestations of the 
human beings’ actions, and thus, there are many potentialities that the person has. This can all be 
explained by widening the Boethian definition of person, an individual substance of a rational 
nature. This being conscious of one’s actions is living through one’s actions. When I experience 
guilt for lying to my co-worker, I am experiencing something that would not be possible without 
myself as myself. This is what Wojtyla calls the reflexive consciousness.  We might ask, how is 
this different from Locke and his definition of a person? This is the difference: my being aware 
of my human actions (in the Thomistic sense) gives me a glimpse into my subjectivity. Locke, as 
we saw in chapter one, reduced the person to a mere consciousness, to being a self-reflective 
being. But Wojtyla is saying that through our actions we come to glimpse this irreducible aspect 
of the person. We can then say with Locke that we are self-conscious beings but this does not 
mean that we are merely so.  
 
B. Distinction between Reflective and Reflexive Awareness 
Given that it is not clear what Wojtyla means by reflexive consciousness, I thought it 
would be apropos to refer to John Crosby.92 To make clearer what we mean by subjectivity or 
coming to know ourselves as subjects rather than objects, we refer to the intentionality of 
consciousness. Crosby, following Brentano, sees consciousness as always being conscious of 
something. Without this act of understanding the object could not be known. Seen thus, the act of 
                                                 
 
92 John Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person  (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 1996). 84-123. 
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understanding is something dynamic and cannot be separated from its intended object. Thus, 
there is a subject by virtue of its relation to the object outside oneself.93   
Crosby, in his discussion of intentionality, sees that Brentano is missing something from 
the analysis of consciousness. Crosby sees that there is another dimension to consciousness that 
is not outward directed but rather inward directed. This is what he calls self-presence. The 
relation I have to myself as subject that constitutes the interiority of my existence is what he calls 
self-presence. Let me explain. If what Crosby calls self-presence were another intentional object, 
then there would be an infinite regress of selves. This is similar to what we said in the last 
chapter on Marcel’s discussion of the Cartesian self. Once we objectify the self, we then have 
another self and so on ad infinitum. To stop this regress we must admit that there is a subject at 
the pole of intentionality. In every conscious act the self is present to the object.  
What about when I describe my life story to someone? Am I not objectifying myself as 
an object in telling the story of something that cannot be objectified? No, for in objectifying 
myself I am still a self who is telling the story and making it intelligible to the other person. That 
is to say, I include myself as subject in the telling of the story. If I, myself, were not included, 
there would be no grounding for such story telling. Again, this self-presence is being present or 
experiencing myself as a subject and not an object. This is clearly a given when I speak about 
experiencing myself inwardly. Again, in telling someone else a story of something that happened 
to me, there will always be something missing from the story. There is something that is 
irreducible to analysis, for if the self were reducible to another self then, again, there would be 
an infinite number of selves to which we would be referring.  
                                                 
93 Ibid. 83. 
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This is the difference between reflective and reflexive consciousness: to experience 
ourselves from within as subjects is to have a reflexive awareness or consciousness of the self as 
subject and not as object. To experience the self as an object is to reflect on the experience of the 
self and objectify the self. Let us now see how this reflexive aspect of consciousness that makes 
self-presence possible relates to the whole picture of the human person as a substance.  
 
C. Man as an Actor 
How then do we unify these aspects of the person? If we do not want to absolutize any 
one aspect, then we need to find something to unify these aspects of consciousness. To reduce 
the person to any one aspect is to do injustice to the concept of dignity of persons. As we have 
seen, if we reduce the person to any capacity, then we have lost the person to a part rather than 
being true to the whole. For the purposes of this chapter I only will seek to find how to unify 
these activities of the human person.94  
Being influenced by the philosopher Max Scheler, a phenomenologist, Wojtyla 
recognized the objection that a person is more than a rational being participating in rational 
activity.95 Given that persons are irreducible to any one activity, Wojtyla wanted to find a basis 
for such diverse activities. Focusing on the phenomenon of action, Wojtyla corrects Scheler by 
pointing out that the person experiences himself as the cause of his own action. This experience 
                                                 
94 Wojtyla speaks more about the ends than the activities man participates in. The ends are not merely 
objective ends that each person is destined to fulfill, but rather, are personalized by virtue of his or her uniqueness. 
This personalization of ends does not detract from the objectivity of the Good but rather it amplifies and builds upon 
what is already in nature. Most contemporary philosophers do not speak about nature and its end, but Wojtyla 
accepts a Thomistic understanding of causes. Personally, I do not see why we cannot speak of the classic four causes 
as explanations of reality.  
 
95 Jameson Taylor, "Beyond Nature," Review of Metaphysics 63, no. 2 (2009). 421. 
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of oneself as efficient cause permits the inference to the human person as a substance in the 
Thomistic-Aristotelian sense. By substance, we mean the metaphysical subject of these diverse 
acts – man’s existence is a suppositum.96 The term, suppositum, is to be understood in the 
context of man’s existence and experience of himself as subject, not as object. Yet this is what 
unifies man as subject and object – this experience of one’s efficacy makes possible the 
inference to man as a metaphysical subject. The condition for being a person is the metaphysical 
subject – it which makes possible the experience of one’s subjectivity! The definitions of the 
person as seen throughout this paper have mistaken the condition of the person with the reality of 
personhood itself. In other words, the metaphysics set up the conditions for the person’s 
activities but it does not provide us with a abstract definition of personhood – the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of personhood. To ask for an abstract definition of personhood is asking the 
wrong question. As we saw with Marcel’s analysis of primary and secondary reflection, the 
person is not merely an object of abstract thought. We have to allow for a level of pre-reflective 
experience to fully account for our experiences of ourselves as subjects.  
The next step in trying to tie the knot between the two aspects of dignity is to ‘see’ the 
principle operari sequitur esse – “for something to act it must first exist.” Conversely, a thing’s 
operation or activity is the appropriate avenue for knowledge of that existent. The actions of the 
person – as opposed to what merely happens to the person – make the most sense if we trace it 
back to a human person.97 What other metaphysical explanation could there be? Would it make 
sense that the action has no origin in the subject? From our discussion of intentionality, we saw 
that the subject is not without its object – in this case, an action. Actions do not make sense apart 
                                                 
96 Taylor points out that while Wojtyla uses the word “ontic structure” he also uses suppositum in the 
classical sense. In other words suppositum is the subject of being in the metaphysical sense. Cf.422. 
 
97 Taylor, "Beyond Nature."426. 
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from their causes. Hence the action refers to the whole person and not just pure consciousness, as 
Husserl would like us to think, or Locke’s self-consciousness. The actions are activities and, as 
such, involve the whole person, which includes the capacity to set ends for oneself and 
experience oneself as a subject. The grounding is found in the structure of the person as a human 
being. Boethius is correct in his definition of the person being a substance of a rational nature but 
wrong in thinking that the person is conceptually closed ended; subjectivity is something that we 
do in fact grasp in our experiences, being self-present. This aspect is incommunicable and not 
shareable but nonetheless is a mode of knowledge.   
To say that man is an actor is to distinguish him from man as an individual substance (in 
the Aristotelian sense) and man as a subject of experience. Man is rather an actor – an agent. One 
cannot act without being an individual substance and being conscious of the action. For a human 
action to be such it must not only be performed by a human being, but the consciousness of 
acting is necessary. Analysis of an action such as giving oneself to another requires not only that 
the necessary conditions for human action be met, but also a personal awareness of the action as 
one of love.  
 
V. Response to Zagzebski 
Instead of seeing the two aspects of dignity – infinite value and irreplaceability of persons – 
as two properties that are independent of the species human being, it seems more reasonable to 
see these values as aspects of the acting person. The capacities that make up the human person 
are not mere capacities that can be applied to anything in logical possible world scenarios, but 
are to be understood as essential to the nature of being human. If we are not to leave the analysis 
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on the level of conceptual analysis, we ought to say that the human being has by his/her nature 
infinite value and is irreplaceable.  
 Given what we have said about the structure of the human actor – we can say that the 
human person is an individual substance of a rational nature whose activities or capacities admit 
of infinite value, and who is also a subject who is irreplaceable. The structure is not a part, but a 
pattern of relations between its parts and elements. How could we distinguish between one thing 
or another if there was no pattern of relations to be found? The key here is functionality.98 The 
person cannot be identified with any part – for if he/she were identified with a part, then he/she 
would not be a subject. This is human nature – “the sum total of potentials for action.”99Not to 
delve too deeply into Thomistic metaphysics, it suffices to sketch reasons for why we need to 
unify actions in the actor and not do mere conceptual analysis.  
 
In response to Zagzebski, I would say that what we have here is a paradox and not an 
inconsistency. Given that the human person is both communicable and incommunicable, it 
follows that the human person and his/her dignity cannot be spoken of with complete conceptual 
precision since the subjective aspect of dignity, by its nature, cannot be analyzed into its 
constituent parts. If we were to analyze the human person’s dignity into two concepts, then, yes, 
we would have an inconsistency. But, subjectivity, as seen in chapter three, is not something that 
we can fully conceptualize – we can grasp this aspect of the human person, but not surround it 
with our intellects. We touch subjectivity but we do not fully conceptualize it, for if we did, we 
                                                 
98 Glowienka  Emerine, "Person as 'That Which Is Most Perfect in All of Nature'," Southwest Philosophical 
Studies 20(1998). 56-57. 
 
99 Ibid. 58. 
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would not have the problem of understanding what dignity is. Therefore, the human person has 
two aspects of dignity grounded in his/her human nature without any inconsistency.  
Zagzebski, in arguing that something un-shareable cannot be grounded in something 
shareable is not allowing for the possibility of another starting point of analysis. As we have said 
above and in the previous chapter, it seems that we know what is irreplaceable about persons but 
we also know about what is infinitely valuable about persons. As has been argued throughout 
this thesis, one cannot have dignity without both aspects. Not only would dignity be 
unintelligible with only one of these aspects, it would also seem ad hoc to claim that anyone 
actually has it without the proper metaphysical framework of the human person. The argument 
throughout this thesis attempted to show that our friendships, love towards our loved ones, and 
concrete experiences all point to human beings as being in-and-of-themselves special. It would 
be absurd to take the above experiences and say, “I love my loved ones because they seem to 
possess something loveable in themselves.” No, on the contrary, it seems that we do ‘see’ our 
loved ones as ones who really do have dignity. Therefore, it seems most reasonable to conclude 
that all human persons have dignity and not merely some of them.  
The knot that ties the two aspects of dignity together is the human being as an individual 
substance of a rational nature. As seen above in Karol Wojtyla’s analysis, rational nature should 
be seen not merely as calculation, but as a grounding for all activities – one is of which is being 
aware of oneself and others as subjects and not merely objects. Wojtyla pointed out that there is 
no inconsistency between something being un-shareable and shareable in nature since these are 
two aspects of the same thing. Analogously, we could say that this computer is unique and 
shareable in itself. This computer can be replaced by another, but it has its own unique identity – 
it is this computer and not another. The two aspects of the one thing do not contradict each other, 
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but are a paradox. If they were to contradict, then we could not speak of this computer being 
unique and shareable in nature – we would have to say one or the other. But again, the terms, 
unique and shareable, are analogous in language and not univocal. The terms themselves are 
conceptual and non-conceptual and, as such, we can say many things about one thing without 
inconsistency. The same thing can be one and many – ‘many’ referring to what we can say about 
the thing, and ‘one’ about that which holds the many properties together. The one is the many – 
the copula refers to an analogy – and, as such, we can speak without inconsistency.  
Similarly, we can speak about the human person being both unique and shareable in dignity. 
Given that the subjective nature is such that it cannot be objectified except on pain of infinite 
regress, we can say that we are speaking analogously when we attempt to objectify what is 
subjective. Access to the knowledge of subjectivity occurs through a different human activity 
than if one were to introspect and conceptualize all of the capacities we have as persons. Once 
we understand both aspects to be true, we can say that the human person is both a subject and an 
object. If we spoke reductively about the concept of subjectivity it would cease to be 
subjectivity! As Marcel showed, we start with existence, the level of being, and then work our 
way to the concepts derived therefrom. Zagzebski, seems to assume that un-shareability and 
shareability are concepts arrived at by analytical reduction – clear and distinct ideas. But given 
what Marcel has shown us, we can see that we need to start out with something indeterminate to 
arrive at something determinate – this is what Karol Wojtyla calls lived experience. If this 
experience is reduced to something determinate, then we do have a inconsistency.   
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  
 Throughout this paper I have tried to show that the person is much more than the sum of 
his capacities. In grounding the person in the human being, we found that it is by the paradoxical 
nature of the human being that he can be said to be both subject and object, judged by different 
aspects. By being a subject the human person is irreplaceable, and by being an object the human 
person has infinite value. Both are aspects of the same human being.  
 The question that needs to be answered by Peter Singer and Ruth Macklin is this: If a 
person is the sum of his/her properties (that are instantiated) – in particular, are self-reflective 
and rational – then what happens when they themselves who are asking the question, “Who is a 
person?” find themselves not exemplifying the properties of rationality or consciousness?  
Referring to what Marcel said about the mystery of the person, the questioner who is asking the 
question is “a problem which encroaches upon its own data, invading them, as it were, and 
thereby transcending itself as a simple problem.”100The problem becomes personal when it is 
asked about oneself, for when the question “Who is a person?” arises, we are creating a view 
from nowhere whereby we are exempt from analysis.  
 Our intuitions seem to point to a realm of mystery when it comes to friendship and love 
between two persons. I am not sure how one could ignore such concrete examples. From what 
we saw with Aristotle, Badhwar and Velleman, the desire was present to account for such unique 
experiences, but in the end their analyses failed to give us what we were looking for. In not 
understanding experience as ‘lived experience,’ we could not get past abstract analysis of the 
                                                 
100 Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism. 19. 
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instances of friendship and love. Badhwar, I think, came the closest in understanding the person 
in his/her dynamism, but did not have any metaphysical subject to ground the unique qualities of 
the person.   
The concept of dignity needs to be approached from both standpoints: the 
phenomenological and the analytical. I would argue though, with Wojtyla, that the person is not 
identical to any function or part. If analysis is the act of breaking things down into their 
constituent parts, then it follows that we can do that with the person and his/her body. But 
analysis is not sufficient, as we saw with Marcel, to account for the feeling we have with our 
bodies and the world around us via experience. Thus we ought not to start with analysis, but 
rather with ‘lived-experience’ to develop a more human understanding of the self.  
The significance of Wojtyla’s philosophy is that he was able, through a Thomistic 
understanding of efficient causality, to infer from such conscious experience of actions the 
author of those actions. The agent/actor/author provides the dynamic structure to ground such 
access to ‘lived experience.’ This author of the personal action is grounded in the Boethian 
definition of person as an individual substance of a rational nature. It would be interesting to 
analyze the differences between substance in the Aristotelian sense and substance in the 
Cartesian sense – it seems Wojtyla is not using substance in the Lockean sense of matter – ‘that I 
know not what.’ Substance, as seen in the previous chapter, is the ontic structure or suppositum.  
A goal for future research is to develop a better understanding of Thomas Aquinas and 
his metaphysics. More specifically, I would like to look closer at Norris Clarke’s synthesis of the 
existential/phenomenological philosophy with Thomism.101 It is my conviction that the 
                                                 
101 More specifically, the books I found in the course of my research but have not had time to delve more 
deeply into are: W. Norris Clarke, The Creative Retrieval of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Essays in Thomistic Philosophy, 
New and Old  (Fordham University Press, 2009); Person and Being  (Marquette University Press, 1993); "The 
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existentialists were correct in pointing to the human person as being irreducible to analysis. It is 
also my conviction that contemporary analytic philosophy is right to analyze things into their 
constituent parts – to make what is obscure clear. The problem is one of methodology and not the 
concept of dignity per se.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Universe as Journey," in The Universe as Journey: Conversations with W. Norris Clarke, S.J (Fordham University 
Press, 1988). 
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